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This dissertation studies the capacity investment decision of a manufacturing
firm facing demand uncertainty in the presence of shortage possibility in pro-
duction resources, as often ignored in the literature. These production resources
can be physical resources (component / raw material) or financial resources
(working capital / budget). The shortage in these resources can be caused by
a variety of supply chain disruptions; examples include global disruptions like
COVID-19 and financial crisis in 2008 and local disruptions like shortage of
components/workforce. The dissertation analyses two important issues related
to capacity management: (i) the effect of production resource disruption on
the capacity investment strategy and the profitability of the firm (including the
significance of profitability loss incurred when the resource shortage possibility is
ignored, and (ii) the role of production resource disruption management strategies,
i.e. using pre-shipment financing to mitigate the effect of financial resource
disruption and using hedging to mitigate physical resource disruption.
The first part (Chapter 3) examines a two stage capacity-production framework
that capacity investment decision is in anticipation of demand and production
resource uncertainties and production quantity is decided after the revelation
of uncertainties. I characterize the optimal decisions and investigate how the
uncertainties (demand and production resource variability and the correlation
between the two) affect the optimal capacity investment level and the profitability.
My results provide rule of thumb for the managers in capacity management. I also
study the significance of profitability loss incurred when the resource uncertainty
is ignored in choosing capacity level. Through both analytical and extensive
numerical analysis, I show that the profitability loss is high when 1) correlation
is high; 2) either production resource variability is sufficiently high or sufficiently
low; and 3) either demand variability is sufficiently high or sufficiently low.
The second part (Chapter 4) examines the role of pre-shipment finance in
managing financial production resource (working capital/budget) disruption.
Pre-shipment finance allows the firm to transfer the purchase orders (which will
be paid after production) to an external party that provides immediate cash flow
(at a cost) that can be used for financing the production process. To this end, I
characterize the optimal pre-shipment finance level (proportion of sales revenues
transferred) and the production volume in the production stage and the optimal
capacity investment level in the capacity stage. I make comparisons with the
results in the first chapter to understand how pre-shipment financing alters the
effects of demand and production resource uncertainties on the optimal capacity
investment level, expected profit and profitability loss due to ignoring resource
uncertainty. I identify that applying pre-shipment finance makes the capacity
investment and profits more resilient to changes in spot price uncertainty.
The third part (Chapter 5) studies the role of procurement hedging contract in
managing physical production resource (e.g., component/raw material) disrup-
tion. With the hedging contract, the firm can engineer the production resource
uncertainty at the capacity investment stage—for example, with full hedging this
uncertainty can be completely removed. I provide the joint characterization of
the optimal hedging level and capacity investment decisions. I find that these
decisions critically depend on the covariance between demand and production
resource uncertainties and the unit capacity investment cost. For example, I
find that fully hedging is always optimal when the correlation is non-positive. I
highlight conditions under which the firm optimally does not hedge at all or use
partial hedging strategy. I then investigate the significance of the profitability
loss due to i) misspecification of capacity level by ignoring production resource
uncertainty and ii) misspecification of hedging strategy (using full hedging which
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It is well established that capacity investment decision, which is an important
operational decision of manufacturing firms in a variety of industries, is subject
to demand uncertainty; the capacity investment level for a product needs to be
decided long before the actual product demand is realized. In practice, aside
from the demand uncertainty, these manufacturing firms may also experience
uncertainty in the production resources. When the production resources are
variable, a shortage in these resources can limit the actual production; in particular,
when the realized production resources volume is less than the planned production
quantity. A key feature of this paper is to consider production resources uncertainty
together with demand uncertainty.
These production resources can be financial (e.g., budget) or physical (e.g.,
labor, raw material, component) resources. On the financial production resources,
the shortage in these resources can be attributed to the worsened external financing
conditions (e.g., credit crunch, liquidity shocks); or to a decrease in internal
financing (where the financial resources are allocated to another subsidiary). For
example, in 2018, it is reported that majority of the small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) in UK have experienced unavailability of financial resources (Financial
Times, Bounds (2018)). Such liquidity problem due to lack of capital resources
is challenging not only to SMEs but also to capital intensive companies. For
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example, China’s National Electric Vehicle Sweden (NEVS) temporarily halted
output of its Saab car due to shortage of funds in 2014 (The Wall Street Journal,
Stoll (2014)). In Diamond mining industry, Indian diamond manufacturers
released the excess inventory due to struggling to get credit, even though there is
a growth of the middle class in China and India should boost demand (Financial
Times, Dempsey and Parkin (2019)). On the physical resources, the shortage in
these resources can be attributed to a variety of factors, e.g. reduction in raw
material yield, less supply of components and tightening immigration policy.
In recent breakout of Covid-19, the wreaking havoc of production resources
disruption has caught attention in variety of industries (Harvard Business Review,
Haren and Simchi-Levi (2020)). For example, drug-makers are facing significant
disruption to global production due to Chinese lock-down and cutting off supplies
of Chinese-made essential ingredients (Financial Times, Findlay et al. (2020)).
Coincidentally, the world’s fifth-biggest carmaker, Hyundai shut down all its car
factories in South Korea after running out of components from China and searches
new sources of engine wire-harness (Financial Times, White et al. (2020)). These
examples demonstrate that it is important to consider the uncertainty in the
availability of these (financial or physical) production resources in choosing the
right capacity to invest.
The stochastic capacity investment problem has received wide attention in the
operations management literature; see Van Mieghem (2003) for a comprehensive
review. The majority of this literature examine how demand uncertainty affect
capacity investment and profitability in the absence of production resources
uncertainty. Among the few papers that consider production resource and demand
uncertainties, such as Ciarallo et al. (1994) for physical resources, Boyabatlı et al.
(2016) for financial resources, there is no paper that examines how production
resource uncertainty affects the optimal capacity investment and profitability
of the firm. Intuitively, ignoring production resource uncertainty leads to over-
investment in capacity and, thus profitability loss, however, it is still an open
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question under what conditions this profitability loss is significant. In this paper,
we attempt to fill this void by studying the optimal capacity investment problem
with the presence of demand and production resource uncertainties.
To this end, we formulate a two-stage profit maximization problem. In the
first stage, the firm chooses the capacity level to invest with the presence of
demand and production resource uncertainties. In the second stage, after both
the demand and production resource is realized, the firm then decides on the
optimal production quantity. We note that the demand and resource shocks might
be independent or positively/negatively correlated, as discussed in Babich (2010).
With the model, we characterize the optimal capacity investment policy and
answer the following research questions:
1) How would the optimal capacity level and profitability be impacted by the
demand and production resource variability and the correlation between the two?
2) If the possibility of production resource shortage is ignored in capacity
planning, as often done in practice and the academic literature, would the resulting
profitability loss be significant and how do the demand and production resource
uncertainties affect this profitability loss?
The Optimal Capacity Investment Policy. In answering the first question, we
provide analytical results assuming that the demand and production resource
follow a bivariate normal distribution. In addressing the second question,
we conduct extensive numerical experiments when analytical results are not
attainable. To delineate the impact of production resource uncertainty on our
results, whenever applicable, we make comparisons with a benchmark scenario
in which the possibility of production resource shortage is ignored in capacity
planning. We summarize our main findings as below:
Impacts of Demand and production resource Uncertainties. We conduct
sensitivity analysis, both analytically and numerically, to investigate the impact
of demand and production resource variabilities and their correlation on both
optimal capacity investment level and corresponding expected profit. When the
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possibility of production resource shortage is ignored, conventional understanding
suggests that a higher demand variability increases optimal capacity level and
profitability, as established in the traditional stochastic capacity investment
literature. Interestingly, we find that a higher demand variability decreases both
optimal capacity level and profitability when the demand variability is lower
than certain threshold and the correlation is negative. Otherwise, the sensitivity
results are consistent with conventional understanding. In terms of the sensitivity
to production resource variability, we find that a higher production resource
variability is beneficial (i.e., increases profitability) only when this variability
is lower than certain threshold, the correlation is positive and unit capacity
investment cost is low; otherwise, a lower production resource variability is
beneficial. However, the optimal capacity level is monotonically increasing
(decreasing) in the production resource variability when unit capacity cost is low
(high) and the correlation is high (low). We also find that a higher correlation
between the demand and production resource leads to higher optimal capacity
level and the profitability. These results provide rules of thumb to manufacturing
firms in managing their capacity investment decisions with respect to changing
environmental conditions once the possibility of production resource shortage is
taken into consideration.
Profitability Loss Incurred by Ignoring the Possibility of production resource
Shortage. We calculate the percentage profit loss when the firm, instead using
the optimal capacity investment policy, heuristically uses the benchmark policy
in which the possibility of production resource shortage is ignored. We also
analytically and numerically perform sensitivity analysis of profitability-loss to
understand the effects of uncertainties. We prove that the profitability-loss is
decreasing in the correlation, which implies that the profitability loss would be
most significant when the demand and production resource is negatively correlated.
We also prove that profitability-loss strictly increases in the production resource
variability when the unit capacity cost is higher than certain threshold. We run
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extensive numerical experiments to obtain a comprehensive understanding on
effects of demand and production resource variabilities on this profitability loss.
There are patterns consistently observed throughout numerical analyses regarding
to the sensitivity of profitability loss. For the impact of production resource
variability under a low unit capacity cost scenario, profitability loss decreases in
production resource variability when the variability is smaller than a threshold;
profitability loss increases in production resource variability otherwise. For the
sensitivity on demand variability, when the correlation between demand and
production resource is positive, profitability loss first decreases then increases in
demand variability; otherwise, as demand variability increases, profitability loss
increases.
Pre-shipment Finance in Managing Financial Production Resource Disrup-
tion. Pre-shipment financing creates necessary liquidity for the firm when the
budget is constraining. The firm chooses a loan that is fully secured within
the product selling revenue. Then, we characterize the optimal pre-shipment
finance level (proportion of sales revenues transferred) and the production vol-
ume in the production stage and the optimal capacity investment level in the
capacity stage. We make comparisons with the results in Chapter 3 to under-
stand how pre-shipment financing alters the effects of demand and production
budget uncertainties on the optimal capacity investment level, expected profit and
profitability-loss due to ignoring budget uncertainty. We identify that applying
pre-shipment finance makes the capacity investment and profits more resilient to
changes in both demand and production budget uncertainties. The profitability-
loss from miss-specifying capacity is significantly reduced by using pre-shipment
financing.
Procurement Hedging Contract in Managing Physical Production Resource
Disruption. When production resource is physical such as raw material or
component, pricing of material costs is directly linked to fluctuations in firm’s
production capability. Therefore, one of theway tomanage the potential disruption
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of production resource would be to lock in prices for a production resource at a
pre-determined fixed price through arriving at a fixed price procurement contract.
In managing production resource disruption in the capacity investment stage, we
apply procurement hedging contract, which is beneficial if it can allow the firm to
avoid unnecessary fluctuations of physical production resource, e.g. raw material
or component, in capacity investment spending. In this procurement hedging
contract, the firm alters the distribution of production resource to manage the risk
of production resource disruption. We find that the partial hedging dominates
full hedging and no-hedging when demand and production resource is positively
correlated and the unit cost of investing capacity is low; no-hedging dominates
when the positive correlation between demand and production resource is high
and the unit capacity investment cost is even lower. We identify that optimal
partial hedging decreases in both demand variability and the correlation, whereas
it increases in production resource variability. We show that the profitability
increases in demand variability, production resource variability and the correlation.
Our numerical analysis shows that the profitability loss due to ignoring production
resource shortage possibility in choosing capacity investment level is significant
when demand variability is large, production resource variability is large and the
correlation is low. And the profitability loss due to heuristically choosing always
full hedging increases in both demand and production resource variability.
1.1 Organization of the Dissertation
The structure of the rest of dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I
provide an extensive overview of the literature and discuss the contribution of our
work by comparison with existing papers. The work contributes to following two
streams of literature: 1) the stream of literature that studies inventory-production
systems under uncertain capacity, 2) the stream of literature in OM-finance that
studies the impact of financial constraints on operational decisions. In addition,
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I discuss the relevance of our work to the financial economic literature about
the relation between productive investment and uncertainties (demand or/and
production resource).
In Chapter 3, we investigate the impact of production resource and demand
uncertainties on capacity investment of a manufacturing firm. The stochastic
capacity management problem of the firm is formulated in Section 3.1, its optimal
strategy is defined in Section 3.2. Then Section 3.3 is the sensitivity analyses
of this basic model and, lastly, Section 3.4 examine the sensitivity analyses
profitability-loss with numerical experiments.
In Chapter 4, we conduct an extension that the firm can finance its production
after the purchase of the products (after demand is resolved) has been committed,
that is, the basic model with a financing instrument called pre-shipment finance
where the formulation is and the corresponding optimal policy is introduced
in Section 4.2. Through sensitivity analyses in Section 4.3, we show that the
financing makes the capacity investment decision and profitability more resilient
to uncertainties. In Section 4.4, we conduct the numerical analysis to show that
the profitability loss due to miss-specify capacity level is negligible.
In Chapter 5, we conduct an extension that the firm can hedge away the
production resource uncertainty at the capacity investment stage, where the
model formulation and the optimal strategy are introduced in Section 5.2 and
5.3, respectively. Through sensitivity analyses with respect to optimal capacity
level, optimal hedging strategy and the corresponding profitability in Section 5.4,
we show that the unfavourable uncertainties are removed by hedging strategy,
in other words, the demand variability, production resource variability and the
correlation between the two are either not affect the optimal decisions or increases
the optimal capacity and profitability. Also, we perform profitability loss in
Section 5.5. In the last, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary on the




Our work contribute to two streams of literature that study the production
resources uncertainty. The first stream studies the inventory-production systems
with unreliable physical production resources; the second stream is related to
OM-finance interface that studies operational capacity and production decisions
under financial constraints, by reason that financial constraints behave the same
as production resource. I will highlight papers that investigate the impact of
demand uncertainty or/and financial constraints uncertainty on the investment
and point out the research gap that our work try to fill. Throughout the review,
I summarize their research questions, main results and contributions of these
relevant papers, more importantly, based on this review, our contribution to the
literature is proposed.
The stream of literature that studies the inventory-production systems with
supply uncertainty is discussed in Section 2.1. I review researches that study
optimal inventory and production decisions under physical production resources
in different business environments. The physical production resources uncertainty
in the manufacturing industry was earliest identified by Lee and Billington (1993)
who state, in the production process of HP printers, both process and supply
activities may incur uncertainty. Process uncertainty comes from workforce
level uncertainty and production rework; and supply uncertainty comes from
8
quantity and quality of raw materials, components and delivery. Therefore,
from formulation perspective, there are four types of uncertainty: random
capacity, random yield, random supply lead time, and lastly, probabilistic on/off
of production capacity which is called supply disruption and can be considered
as special case of the rest types of uncertainties. Physical production resources
uncertainty refers to random capacity category. Our work contributes to the
literature that relaxing the assumption that random demand and random capacity
are independent and increasing the understanding of random capacity in operations
management, therefore, this part of reviewwould focus on papers study operational
models with random capacity.
The extensive review of operational capacity and production models under
financial constraints is in Section 2.2. Financial constraints come from capital
market imperfection indicating that firms are not always able to secure enough
funds for production. This constraints also service similar effect as what random
capacity does. Specifically, financial constraints may lead to cash crunch, that
further cause the manufacturers unable to proceed the production up to the
planned volume due to lack of working capital. Therefore, financial constraints
can also be regarded as limited production resources. Financial constraints have
been widely studied in OM-finance field, however, only few researches about
the impact of its uncertainty on the operational decisions and corresponding
profitability (excepting Babich (2010) and Boyabatlı et al. (2016)). I will provide
an extensive review of the development of the literature.
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2.1 Physical Production Resources Uncertainty
Physical production resources as the maximum productive capacity usually varies
stochastically because of uncertainties in production processes. It may truncate
planned production volume to the materialized volume of production resources.
There exists a stream of literature that studies the impact of the uncertain capacity
in the content of inventory-production problem.
Ciarallo et al. (1994) is the first to introduce uncertain capacity to the
newsvonder framework. The decision of the framework is the production target
(also called planned production quantity) in the presence of uncertain capacity
and uncertain demand. After the uncertain capacity and demand are realized,
the actual production quantity is the minimum between capacity and production
target. The objective is to minimize the total expected costs that is composed
by production, holding and penalty costs. Since then, researches that study
multi-period newsvonder frameworks with uncertain capacity primarily focus
on adding more operational features, characterizing the structure of the optimal
policy, and understanding the impact of uncertain capacity on the optimal policy
structure comparing with the one without uncertain capacity, so as to serve as a
building block for dynamic inventory models. I will review these researches in
the following paragraph.
The seminal work of Ciarallo et al. (1994) show that for a periodic-review
finite-horizon newsvendor model with uncertain capacity, an order-up-to policy is
optimal, and the optimal planned production quantity is identical to the results of
the model without uncertainty capacity in the single period scenario. Wang and
Gerchak (1996) add another uncertain feature on top of Ciarallo et al. (1994)’s
work, that is random yield in the model describing the fact that only a random
proportion of the actual production quantity could be qualified to satisfy demand.
They also show that the random capacity is irrelevant to the optimal policy,
because the optimal policy possesses the same structure as the optimal policy
obtained by Henig and Gerchak (1990) for the case in which the random capacity
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is not considered. Inspired by frozen seafood industry operations, Khang and
Fujiwara (2000) formulate a multi-period newsvendor model with raw material
supply uncertainty in each period and constant demand, different from Ciarallo
et al. (1994), the raw material supply volume is known and constraints production
volume (one unit of raw material turns to one unit of finished product). They
show that optimal order-up-to level is capped by the realized raw material supply
volume and myopic ordering policy (buy all raw materials or satisfy all demand,
whichever is possible) can be optimal under certain condition. Yang (2004)
also study a multi-period newsvendor model with demand uncertainty and raw
material supply uncertainty in each period. Similar as Khang and Fujiwara
(2000), the raw material is materialized as the beginning of each period, but
differently, raw material is storable and the firm accepts all raw material; also
raw material is tradeable to its spot market. They contribute to the literature
by providing a combination of two base-stock policy: one for raw material
inventory and one for finished product inventory. Yang et al. (2005) extend the
multi-period newsvendor problem with Markovian in-house production capacity
and outsourcing option with setup cost and variable cost. The production level is
decided after the realization of capacity. They obtain that the optimal outsourcing
policy is (B, () policy due to setup cost and optimal inventory policy is modified
base-stock policy. For the sensitivity results: a higher current capacity level
(stochastically) leaves the firm better off and both base-stock level and outsourcing
level decrease. Feng (2010) extend Ciarallo et al. (1994)’s newsvendor framework
with price-dependent random demand. She obtains that basestock policy is not
optimal and the capacity uncertainty induces the optimal policy depending on
the inventory level. She shows that optimal policy is monotone with respect
the average capacity level but not with respect to the variability of the capacity.
Feng and Shi (2012) extend Feng (2010)’s framework by adding multiple supply
resources with uncertain capacity. They reveal that both supply diversification
(due to multiple supply resources) and dynamic pricing are effective in raise profit
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when newsvendor’s cost parameters decreases. Tan et al. (2016) also extend
Ciarallo et al. (1994)’s newsvendor framework with one more ‘slow’ supply
resource with random capacity, therein, ‘slow’ means one more period delivery
lead time than ‘normal’ supply resource. They show that the slower supplier
plays a crucial role in mitigating stockout risk when demand surge and the fast
supplier is restricted by either capacity limitation or capacity uncertainty.
Besides papers that study multi-period newsvendor framework focus on the
optimal policy development, there are papers investigate single-period newsvendor
framework, in concern with other issues. Hu et al. (2008) address the optimal
transshipment for a firm that produces in two manufacturing facilities each
of which serves its individual uncertain market demand and faces capacity
uncertainty. They analytically discuss how optimal policy with transshipment
strategy is affected by stochastically higher facilities capacities; and numerically
discuss under which condition the benefit of transshipment is high. The focus of
this work are the effect of random capacity on optimal policy and profitability
of transshipment strategy. Different from their work, firstly, we don’t consider
transshipment and directly address how capacity and demand variability affecting
optimal policy; secondly, we discuss the significance of profitability-loss due to
ignoring random capacity that is missing in their work. Wang et al. (2010) study
a newsvendor model that can source from two unreliable suppliers, where the
unreliability comes from the random loss of design capacity of suppliers. They
examine two process improvement strategy: dual sourcing and exerting effort
to increase supplier’s reliability (process improvement). And they identify the
conditions, under which dual sourcing or process improvement is more favourable.
The effect of uncertainties is not discussed.
In this stream of literature, Babich (2010) is the closest paper to ours. He
investigates a manufacturer’s capacity reservation and subsidy decisions to a
supplier who has risky financial state to generate the capacity. The goal of his
paper is to model the relationship between the supplier’s financial state and the
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supplier’s capabilities to fulfill the manufacturer’s order. Different from his
model, we consider a manufacturer internalizes the capacity establishment and
the financial trouble may happen in the production stage. In addition, his model
is dynamic periodic-review model and ours is two-stage stochastic programming
model. In his work, the effect of financial constraints from the other party in
supply chain on capacity investment decision has been numerically discussed.
Remark: In this inventory-production system with uncertain capacity stream
of literature, the potential correlation between uncertain capacity and demand
are neglected, therefore they obtain either the relation between optimal inven-
tory/production level and capacity variability is monotone. Our research fill this
gap by assuming uncertain capacity and demand are correlated and analytically
provide the sensitivity results of how capacity and demand uncertainties and their
correlation shape the optimal inventory level.
2.2 FinancialConstraints inCapacityManagement
Our paper also related to the literature that considers financial market frictions in
capacity investment management, because the production resources uncertainty
can also be variable financial constraints. Our contribution to the literature is
to understand when production demand and financial constraint are correlated
how financial constraint variability shapes capacity investment level. Stochastic
models for capacity management has been well studied from operations literature,
see Van Mieghem (2003) for an extensive review, in which all of the models
assume that one is always able to secure funds to adopt ‘optimal’ capacity
investment and production plans. As the value of the interplay between capacity
management and financial risk is illustrated (Birge, 2015), increasingly number
of papers consider stochastic capacity investment models accommodating the risk
due to financial market imperfections, the constraints could be in different forms,
e.g. transaction costs, exchange rate, bankruptcy costs, taxes and regulations,
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costly or slow information diffusion, agency problems, moral hazards and so on.
Particularly, the contemporary researches that demonstrate the value of financial
constraints and its uncertainty in capacity management are listed below.
There are papers that involve the financial constraints as constant so that the
variability feature of it is missing. Babich and Sobel (2004) study a multi-period
model of capacity expansion and production where the IPO event is treated as a
stopping time for entrepreneurs to cash-out. Each period the entrepreneurs make
operational and financial decisions: capacity increment, production, bank loan
amount and whether or not to IPO. They provide monotone threshold rule to yield
an optimal IPO decisions. In the paper, they mentioned that operational capacity
may deteriorate over time in a random rate. The impact of this capacity deteriorate
rate uncertainty and demand uncertainty are not discussed in the paper. Xu and
Birge (2004) extend the newsvendor model to include financing constraint, whom
is called capital-constrained-newsvendor , to elevate the financial constraint, the
newsvendor can issue both debt and dividend. They demonstrate that facing
the bankruptcy risk due to demand uncertainty, the firm will reduce inventory
investment facing financial constraint. Dada and Hu (2008) also consider a
capital-constrained-newsvendor, therein, he borrows from endogenous bank that
determines interest rate. Both of the seminal works prove the negative impact
of financial constraint on the profitability that showing the importance of taking
the financial constraint into account. Ning and Sobel (2018) study a price-taking
firm using only internal financing and lives in a stochastic market environment
to make multi-period capacity investment/divestment, production and dividend
issue decisions. The effects of financial frictions in the form of internal financing
and the goal of their paper is to study how this internal financing affect the optimal
policy. In terms of financing constraint, in their model, all operations are financed
by the cash reserve, whereas in our paper only the production is constrained by a
random budget. In addition, capacity investment is irreversible in our model.
Boyabatlı and Toktay (2011), Chod and Zhou (2014) andBoyabatlı et al. (2016)
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analyze flexible capacity investment in financially constrained environments.
They all study a budget constraint that applies to the capacity investment stage.
Boyabatlı and Toktay (2011) endogenize the cost of borrowing and examine the
effect of capital market imperfections on the firm’s technology choice. Chod
and Zhou (2014) consider the optimal mix of flexible and dedicated capacity
showing that flexibility reduces the risk of costly default and the agency cost.
Also as flexible capacity investment cost decreases and the optimal capacity mix
becomes more flexible, the optimal amount of debt increases monotonically.
In addressing financial market fictions, optimal financial hedging strategy with
capacity investment decision are studied as follows: Chod et al. (2010) examine a
value-maximizing firm that produces two products and show that the firm can
use operational flexibility to mitigate the demand risk and financial hedging to
cope with profit risk. The firm value is a concave function of pre-tax profit due
to market imperfections such as taxes, the cost of financial distress, and costly
external financing (Smith and Stulz, 1985). They show that product flexibility
(flexible capacity for producing two different products) and financial hedging
tend to be complements (substitutes) when demands are positively (negatively)
correlated. In their paper, the financial market imperfections twist the firm being
risk-averse. We model different type of financial market imperfection that is the
risk that production decision is truncated by limited financial resource. Chen et al.
(2014) develop a mean-variance model to investigate manufacturer’s the optimal
financial hedging strategy and capacity investment decision, so as to mitigate the
manufacturer’s risk of multi-country foreign currency exposures due to overseas
suppliers. They numerically study the impact of correlation between production
demand and currency exchange rates on the optimal utility and capacity of the
firm, obtaining that when the exchange rates and demands are perfectly correlated,
the optimal capacities and utilities between a risk-averse and a risk-neutral firm
are identical. They take financial market fictions in a risk preference angle that is
different from our work.
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Other financial issues incurred by financial market friction are also studied:
Natarajan and Swaminathan (2014) study multi-period stochastic inventory
problem in the presence of funding constraints over a finite planning period in
the content of humanitarian operations. The funding constraints in humanitarian
operations have special property, that is, given the total fund fixed, there are
scenarios with uncertain funding and funding timing among the time horizon,
each of the scenario is called a stochastic funding schedule. They identify the
optimal replenishment policy for any given funding schedule and analyze the
impact of uncertainty in funding timing on the total operating costs. Iancu et al.
(2017) study the risk of liquidation for a capital constrained newsvendor with
operating flexibility provided by two-period selling seasons. For leverage, the
newsvendor contracts borrowing base covenant with a bank and thus in the risk
of liquidation. They examine the value of operating flexibility in the presence
of capital market frictions and debt covenants. They find that by providing
risk-shifting incentives in the debt covenant, operating flexibility can substantially
increase borrowing costs. Alan and Gaur (2018) examine the effect of bankruptcy
costs and information asymmetry on the firm’s operating plans under asset-based
lending, where commercial bank screens newsvendor-type firms. They show
that asset-based lending enables the bank to mitigate information asymmetry
by screening firms and control each firm type. de Véricourt and Gromb (2019)
investigate the behavioural feature of capacity investment when investor finance
the activity. They study firm’s capacity choice given that it must be financed by
investor, as a result, sharing profits with investors causes governance problems
(two moral hazards), i.e. the firm may “steal” capital which reduces effective
capacity, and “shirk” on market development which reduces demand, in the
sequel, affecting both capacity and demand.
Start-up firms as few trade records and low loan credit corporates have
different operating target and financial concerns from established firms. Swinney
et al. (2011) analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of
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both established firms and start-ups entering new markets in face with demand
uncertainty. Therein, start-up firm aims to minimize the possibility of bankruptcy
due to unable to repay debt whereas the established firm has no financial constraint
and focuses on maximizing the expected profit. They demonstrate the threat
of start-up bankruptcy significantly impacts the dynamics of the competition.
Tanrısever et al. (2012) address debt-financed start-ups’ concern of production
cost reducing R&D investment, that is, financial distress of unable to meet
bank’s financial requirement in short term resulting in liquidation versus better
business growth in long term. They incorporate important start-ups’ concerns of
uncertain R&D performance, uncertain demand and uncertain production cost
of competitor. Tanrisever et al. (2019) also study a production cost-reduction
investment model. Different from Tanrısever et al. (2012)’s work, the bank is
endogenous and loan is in the present of capital market frictions, specifically, there
is a cost of bankruptcy when firm’s revenue is unable to recover the face value
of the loan. Both of the papers demonstrate that the production-cost-reduction
investment affects firm’s operational and financial capabilities. It is worth noting
that Tanrisever et al. (2019) numerically perform the impact of demand variability
and the aforementioned capital market frictions on the optimal investment.
The closest paper to ours is Boyabatlı et al. (2016). They also consider
production stage budget uncertainty in the capacity investment content. The
differences are 1) we don’t focus on the technology choice of the capacity
investment; 2) we make allowance for the influence of variability of the production
resources on the capacity investment and the profitability.
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Chapter 3
Stochastic Capacity Investment in
the Presence of Physical and
Financial Production Resource
Disruptions
In this chapter, we consider a manufacturing firm which produces and sells
a single type of products on the market. The firm first makes the capacity
investment for the production of the single product, with the presence of random
market demand and random production resources. We define production resource
broadly so that it can represent either a financial budget or the availability of
limiting physical resource, e.g. raw material, components and workforce level.
We adopt stylized stochastic programming approach to characterize the firm’s
optimal capacity investment strategy. We conduct sensitivity analysis analytically
provide the answers of how production resource and demand uncertainties jointly
affect optimal capacity level and the profitability of the manufacturing firm. In
addition, extensive numerical experiments are conducted to verify the above
sensitivity analyses and provide the condition under which the profitability-loss
is significant.
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The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, we introduce
the formulation and assumptions of the model. In Section 3.2, we establish the
optimal capacity investment policy and compare it with the benchmark policy
which ignores the possibility of production resource shortage. Then we derive
analytical results for the sensitivity of optimal capacity investment policy as well
as the profitability in Section 3.3. Specifically, we answer the research question:
Howwould the optimal capacity level and profitability be impacted by the demand
and production resource variability and the correlation between the two? Finally,
in Section 3.4, we use analytical analysis as well as complementary numerical
study to answer second research question, if the possibility of production resource
shortage is ignored in capacity planning, as often done in practice and the
academic literature, would the resulting profitability loss be significant and how
do the demand and production resource uncertainties affect this profitability loss?
3.1 Notations and Assumptions of Basic Model
In the basic model, the capacity investment decision is made in the presence of
uncertainties. Other than consumer demand uncertainty that is widely studied
in the field, we take into account production resource uncertainty. After the
realization of uncertainties, the firm makes decision on the optimal production
quantity, subject to its earlier capacity investment and available resources. Finally,
the firm sells the products in the market and collects revenue. The objective
function is to maximize the firm’s expected profit. In the following section, the
notations and assumptions are introduced.
We formulate the problem as a two-stage stochastic programming model,
capacity investment stage and product manufacturing stage, in time sequence. At
the start of capacity investment stage C = 0, an amount equal to l is invested in
capacity, where firm decides  units of productive capacity to purchase at the
net price of l per unit. This decision, that maximizes expected operating profit
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less the total capacity investment cost, is made in anticipation of the demand and
production resource uncertainties denoted by b̃ and Ṽ respectively.
Specifically, the uncertainty of demand is denoted by b̃ which comes from a
demand-dependent price function denoted by ?(@) = b̃ − 1@, that is the price of
the product is a linear inverse demand function. b̃ indicates the maximal price of
this product, above which there would be no buyer willing to purchase. 1 is a
positive constant parameter that represents the price sensitivity of the the buyers.
This demand-price relation provides that if the firm sells @ unit of the product to
the market, it has to charge price at (b − 1@). This demand-price relationship has
been widely adopted in literature, e.g. Van Mieghem and Dada (1999), Caldentey
and Haugh (2009), Swinney et al. (2011) and Tanrısever et al. (2012). Also
this demand-price relationship is justifiable because in practice, unsold units
are generally liquidated through other channels, e.g. secondary markets, at a
discount price. Therefore, on average, higher quantity of products sold leads to
lower price.
Production resource uncertainty Ṽ (in dollar) represents the production
resource availability for providing the product. Ṽ can be the physical production
resource uncertainty proposed by Ciarallo et al. (1994), motivated by the facts
that the productivity level may fluctuate because of variations in worker skills or
operating conditions, in the case of raw materials or components souring, there
may be a lack of information about the production capability. Ṽ can also denote
random production budget proposed by Boyabatlı et al. (2016), motivated by
the facts that firm may not have access to sufficient external financing due to
credit crunch, liquidity shocks and financial crisis; also its internal financing may
not enough if the parent firm reallocates the fund to other divisions. It has a
continuous distribution with positive support [V, V] and bounded expectation `V.
After making investment decision with the presence of these two uncertainties,
these uncertainties are realized, and the firm then makes decisions on the
production C = 1, which is the beginning of production stage. For clarity
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of exposition, (b, V) is the realization of the uncertainties (b̃, Ṽ). Having
demand function and total production resource materialized, the firm decides
the production quantity @, noting that @ ∈ [0, b]. Producing one unit of product
requires one unit of capacity and H (in dollar $) unit of production resource, which
means the product quantity is constrained either by capacity level  decided
in the capacity investment stage or the realized production resource, whichever
is lower. The objective of the firm is to maximize the expected profit at the
beginning of capacity investment stage. To summarize, we illustrate the sequence
of events for the problem in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of events
Let Π denote the expected profit for the firm at a capacity level  at capacity
investment stage and c∗
(
 , b, V
)
denote the firm’s the optimal profit at production
stage given a capacity level  and realization of uncertainties, the formulation of
the problem is as follows. The capacity investment stage problem is
max
 ≥0
Π( ) = max
 ≥0
− l + E
(b,V)
[
c∗( , b̃, Ṽ)
]
, (3.1)
and the production stage problem is
c∗
(




(b − 1@)@ − H@







According to Theory of Constraints proposed by Goldratt (1990), among all
other constraints that may be binding the production quantity, we assume that
either capacity investment level or production resource is the weakest link that
may get in the way of the optimal production plan, besides the product demand.
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Since on the one hand, capacity investment level can be managed in the first stage,
on the other hand, the production resource is uncertain at the first stage and its
possible shortage leads to production resource crunch. As a result, in line with
the theory of constraints, understand the optimal capacity investment strategy is
equivalent to identify the most important limiting factor.
Without loss of generality, throughout the paper, we assume that the capacity
investment is an unconstrained expenditure and is irreversible. In practice,
capacity investment could also be constrained by some resource availability,
i.e. capital budget or/and supply reliability, practically, capacity investment is
usually financed by equity far earlier than production process. Therefore, having
a capital budget constraint in capacity investment stage wouldn’t change the
optimal production strategy. To isolate the role of the uncertainties in changing
capacity investment level, we abstract away the constraint in capacity investment
stage. Analytically, the analyses on how production resource uncertainty and
demand uncertainty influencing capacity investment are easier without capacity
investment capital constraint, ruling out financial constraint in capacity investment
stage is beneficial in concern with both research focus and analytical convenience.
Assumption 1 The mean value of demand function intercept denoted by `b is
larger than unit production cost, specifically, `b > H.
This condition ensures that investing in capacity to carry out the production
is admissible. Moreover, this assumption implies that the firm engages in a
reasonable production stage profitability. In particular, the expected production




(b̃ − 1@)@ − H@
]
= (`b − H)@ − 1@2, takes positive value for some @ ∈ [0,∞).
We complete this section with a summary of mathematical notations and
conventions throughout the remainder of the paper. The probability density
function of probability distribution (b̃, Ṽ) is denoted by 5 (b, V). The conditional
distributions b̃ |V and Ṽ |b have probability density function denoted by 5b |V (b)
and 5V |b (V) respectively. The correlation between b̃ and Ṽ is denoted by d.
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The marginal distribution b̃ is characterized by (0,∞), which has mean `b > H,
standard deviationfb > 0. In a similar, themarginal distribution Ṽ is characterized
by [V, V], which has mean `V > 0, standard deviation fV > 0. All notations for
the model are summarized at Table A.1 in Appendix. In addition, some standard
mathematical representation are summarized: E denotes the expectation operator;
Pr denotes probability; (·)+ denotes the maximum between 0 and the value ·, that
is to say (·)+ := max{0, ·}. Any other notation will be introduced as necessary.
Monotonic relations are in the weak sense unless otherwise stated.
3.2 Characterization of the Optimal Strategy
In this section, we characterize the firm’s optimal capacity investment and
production decisions. The problem is solved using backward induction. In
particular, we first analyse the optimal production decision given capacity  . We
partition the state space (b, V) ∈
{
(b, V) : b > 0, V ∈ [V, V]
}
into four regions,
Ω8, 8 = 0, 1, 2, 3 to denote different optimal production quantity scenarios that we
will show in Theorem 1. The formal definitions of these regions are
Ω0 :=
{


































With the analysis of production constraints, the optimal production strategy is
characterized in Theorem 1 and the expected profitΠ( ) under optimal allocation
is obtained. In Theorem 2, the optimal resource capacity investment level is
obtained from Π( ) and characterized by unit capacity cost l.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Production Strategy of Basic Model) At given capacity
 and realizations of random variables (b̃ = b, Ṽ = V), the optimal production
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level @∗( , b, V) satisfies that
@∗( , b, V) =

0, if (b, V) ∈ Ω0,
b − H
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, if (b, V) ∈ Ω1( ),
 , if (b, V) ∈ Ω2( ),
V
H
, if (b, V) ∈ Ω3( ),
and the optimal profit is c∗( , b, V) =

0, if (b, V) ∈ Ω0,
(b−H)2
41 , if (b, V) ∈ Ω1( ),






)2, if (b, V) ∈ Ω3( ).
General understanding of this theorem is that, given that the internal optimal
production quantity is @∗ = (b−H)
+
21 , this quantity can be either binding by capacity
 or financial capability V/H. More specifically, the optimal production quantity
decision depend on the values of (b, V). We show this result in Figure 3.2 where
the demand intercept realization is on the horizontal axis and the production
resource realization is on the vertical axis.
Figure 3.2: The Optimal Production Strategy of Basic Model








Noting that panel (a) of Figure 3.2 describing a case that production resource
is ample. By ample, we mean that the minimal amount of resource V is sufficient
for manufacturing the products up to the capacity level, because of V ≥ H . In
this case, the value of production resource doesn’t affect the production decision
so that we call it as resource-unconstrained case. When (b, V) ∈ Ω0, @∗ = 0
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because the demand intercept b is so low that the selling price is even lower
than the production cost H. When (b, V) ∈ Ω1( ), optimal production quantity
@∗ = b−H21 is consistent with the internal optimal production quantity. It indicates
no constraint is binding production, because the realization of demand intercept
is not large enough such that both capacity and production resource is larger
than this optimal quantity. When (b, V) ∈ Ω2( ), the demand realization is
very large such that the internal optimal product quantity is not attainable due to
capacity constraint. At the same time, the production resource is large such that
the production resource constraint becomes immaterial comparing with capacity
constraint, as a result, optimal production strategy is utilizing all available capacity
for the production in order to close to the unconstrained optimal quantity.
In contrast, panel (b) of Figure 3.2 as resource-constrained case illustrates
a case that production resource could be constraining. The reason is the given
capacity level is in between of minimal and maximal production quantity that
supported by theminimum andmaximum value of production resource realization,
namely  ∗ ∈ (V/H, V/H). Consequently, in a large demand realization scenario
when internal optimal production quantity is not attainable, Ω2( ) and Ω3( )
indicate that either the capacity constraint is tighter or the resource constraint is,
respectively. Particularly, when (b, V) ∈ Ω3( ), production resource is tighter
than capacity level such that the optimal production strategy is to use up all
production resource. It motivates the firm to alarm the potential uncertainty of
production resource in the first stage to alleviate the shortage and spillover of
production capacity.
In the following, we characterize the optimal capacity investment level in
capacity investment stage. The optimization problem in this stage follows from
Equation 3.1 by substituting E
(b,V)
[
c∗( , b̃, Ṽ)
]
with the characterization provided
in Theorem 1. To be specific, the expected profit as a function of capacity level
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Theorem 2 (Optimal Capacity Investment Strategy of Basic Model) The op-









 * (l), if Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]






  (l), if 0 < l < Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]
.




(b − H − 21 * ) 5b (b)3b (3.3)




(b − H − 21 ) Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
b} 5b (b)3b. (3.4)
Theorem 2 states that the optimal capacity investment level is characterized
by unit capacity cost. When the unit capacity investment cost is high, it is
optimal for the firm to not engage in the investment. When the cost is moderate,





the lowest resource realization is sufficient to finance the production at a level
that the capacity is fully utilized. We define  * (l) as resource-unconstrained
capacity level in view of the corresponding optimality condition (3.3), the right
side of which representing the expected marginal revenue of investing one more
unit of capacity doesn’t depend on production resource. Also, this capacity is
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corresponding to the panel (a) in Figure 3.2. Lastly, when the unit capacity
cost is low, optimal capacity investment level   (l) ∈ (V/H, V/H) is defined as
resource-constrained capacity level, because its marginal revenue (right side of
the optimality condition (3.4)) is affected by uncertain production resource and
this capacity level is corresponding to resource-constrained case in production
stage, that is depicted in the panel (b) of Figure 3.2.
An alternative explanation of this optimal capacity investment strategy
through unified marginal profit of investing one more unit of capacity, that is,




H − 21 ∗) 5 (b, V)3b3V. Since Π( ) is concave in  (referring to the proof of
Theorem 2), optimal capacity investment level  ∗ decreases in unit capacity
cost l is easily derived. As a result, the optimal structure of optimal capacity






and  ∗ = V/H when l = Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]
. Another
observation from above unified optimality condition is that an additional unit of
the capacity only has positive effect on revenue in (b, V) ∈ Ω2( ∗). The reason
is that the capacity level is binding the production when (b, V) ∈ Ω2( ∗) so
that the product quantity is less than the internal optimal value, adding capacity
relaxes the constrain and therefore leads to a profit nearer to the unconstrained
optimal profit.
The influence of production resource shortfall is captured by the term
Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
b̃} of optimality condition (3.4) capturing the probability that the
firm has ample production resource to support production up to capacity level
given a demand intercept b̃. The structure of the optimality condition (3.4) and
optimality condition (3.3) are constructed by a unit capacity investment cost at
the left side of the equal sign and expected marginal revenue of investing one
additional unit of capacity at the right side of the equal sign. The only difference
between these two marginal revenues is that there is an additional term in the




Ṽ > H 
b}. Specifically, the probability of production resource shortfall
is 1 − Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
b̃}. In the case of optimality condition (3.3) that derives
resource-unconstrained capacity level, Pr
{
Ṽ > H *
b̃} ≡ 1. The Similar concept
of this probability was once introduced by Boyabatlı et al. (2016) called financial
flexibility level in which it is a fixed probability, or equivalently it is exogenous.
Whereas in our model, we define Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
b̃} as production resource flexibility
level which is endogenous in a way that is a function of capacity level such that
the firm optimally determines production resource flexibility level to maximize
the optimal expected profit in consideration of production resource crunch. A
key observation from optimality condition (3.4) is that the correlation between
demand and production resource uncertainties, demand volatility and production
resource volatility affect resource-constrained capacity level through their impacts
on the production resource flexibility level. We use this observation to explain
corresponding sensitivity results of resource-constrained capacity in the following
section.
In addition, the impact of price sensitivity to product quantity on the optimal
capacity investment level and corresponding expected profit is presented in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Impact of price sensitivity to product quantity 1) Given the op-
timal capacity investment strategy in Theorem 2, we have
1.  * (l) decreases in 1;






This corollary shows that a higher price sensitivity to product quantity, not only
shrinks the optimal capacity investment level but also hurts the profitability.
Intuitively, as buyers care more about the price, the responsive pricing is less
powerful, because the price of the product they are welling to pay drops quickly
as the firm manufactures more products.
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3.3 Sensitivity of Optimal Capacity Level and Prof-
itability for Basic Model
In this section, we answer the second primary objective of this research, that is
to understand the impact of demand variability, production resource variability
and the correlation between them on the firm’s optimal capacity investment
level and profitability of the firm. Having found the optimal capacity investment
strategy, we analytically prove the properties of the firm’s optimal capacity and
profitability with respect to above mentioned uncertainty parameters. To this
end, we impose distribution assumption for demand intercept and production
resource uncertainties. They follow a bivariate normal distribution throughout
all sensitivity analyses. Due to the tractability of the analysis, bivariate normal
distribution is widely used in the literature to represent two random variables
with correlation, e.g. demand uncertainties (Chod and Rudi, 2005) and revenue
uncertainties (Boyabatlı et al., 2019), since its correlation structure is amenable
to analysis. More specifically, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (b̃, Ṽ) follows a bivariate normal distribution with mean vector








ª®®¬, where the correla-
tion coefficient d ∈ (−1, 1).
To deal with the contradiction between non-negativity of demand intercept and
the production resource realizations and real-valued normal distribution outcomes
in Assumption 2, we assume that their variability are not extremely large, hence,
the effect of the negative values are negligible.
Based on Assumption 2, we find the rotational symmetry of production


























where the correlation is also d. In the new distribution, we find the rotational
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symmetry of optimal production decision such that
@∗ =

0 if (, ) ∈ {(, ) :  ≤ 0}
 if (, ) ∈ {(, ) : 0 <  ≤ min{,  }}
 if (, ) ∈ {(, ) :  ≤ min{,  }}
 if (, ) ∈ {(, ) :  ≥  and  ≥  }
Even if the demand and production resource uncertainties in the production
stage affecting the decision in a symmetrical way, however, the impact of their
uncertainty parameters such as variabilities on optimal capacity investment
decision aren’t not symmetrical. The optimal capacity investment decision of the
basic model is given by
 ∗(l) =

0, if l ≥ lmax;
  (l), if 0 < l < lmax
where lmax := E
b
[
(b̃ − H)+ Pr
{
Ṽ > 0
b̃}] . Comparing with the optimal capacity
investment structure in Theorem 2, there is no interval of unit capacity cost l
under which the optimal capacity investment level equals to  * , equivalently
 ∗ is always solved by optimal condition (3.4). It is because the domain of the
production resource becomes V ∈ (−∞,∞) so that production resource flexibility
level Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
b̃} is strictly less than 1 for all finite  ≥ 0.
In the following, we conduct sensitivity analyses to study the effects of the
correlation between demand and production resource uncertainties, demand
variability fb and production resource variability fV on resource-constrained
capacity   and corresponding optimal expected profit Π( ). Noting that both
optimal capacity level   and expected profit Π( ) are functions of parameters
l, d, fb andfV, for the ease of exposition, we compress the functional relationship
in the following analysis if it is not necessary to point out a particular functional




  (d), d
)
, we would omit writing these functional relationships and just use
notation   and Π( ), if this is not likely to lead to confusion.
The organization of the sensitivity analyses in this section is as follows, we
investigate the effects on optimal capacity investment level   and corresponding
expected profit Π( ) of correlation between production resource and demand
uncertainties d in Section 3.3.1, of demand variability fb in Section 3.3.2 and of
production resource variability fV in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Sensitivity to the Correlation between Production Re-
source and Demand Uncertainties
We start with the effect of the correlation between production resource and demand
uncertainties. Note that the correlation could be positive, negative or zero, we
illustrate the value of correlation when production resource uncertainty is either
under financial constraints scenario or physical resource scenario, respectively.
1) When the production resource referring to financial constraints, the correlation
depends on the characteristics of the product being produced. It is likely that the
production resource is positively correlated with the demand of discretionary
purchase products, or luxury goods, while negatively correlated with the staple
products. To understand the relationship, consider that both the financial resource
availability and the product demand are closely related to the economic condition.
Under condition that the economy is good (bad), the firm would be able to raise
large (small) amount of finance; and at the same time, the market demand for
discretionary purchase goods is high (low), and the demand for staple products is
low (high) as consumers afford higher-end substitutes. 2) When the production
resource referring to physical resource, e.g. raw materials, components and
workforce level. If the production resource uncertainty comes from raw materials
or components, it can happen that raw materials or components are provided by
other factories of the manufacturing firm so that production resource and demand
could be positively correlated due to abundantly exchange of information; it can
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also happen that raw materials or components are provided by external firms
that are competing with the manufacturing firm in the same final product market,
which may result in the demand for the manufacturing firm negatively correlated
with production resource. If the production resource uncertainty comes from
variations in worker skills, it is likely that production resource uncertainty is
independent to demand uncertainty.
As shown in Proposition 1, resource-constrained capacity level increases in
the correlation and the firm benefits from a higher correlation.
Proposition 1 (Impact of correlation between demand and production resource)
1. The resource-constrained capacity level   is strictly increasing in d;
2. The optimal optimal expected profit Π( ) are strictly increasing in d.
To understand the effect of d on resource-constrained capacity level  ,
recall that for the production resource flexibility level Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
b̃} it increases
with the correlation between demand and production resource uncertainties.
For a any fixed  , higher the correlation between Ṽ and b̃, this production
resource flexibility level is higher, which resulting in the increase of expected
marginal revenue from optimality condition (3.4). Therefore, the capacity level
  increases in d.
For the effect of d on optimal expected profit Π( ), intuitively, as the
correlation increases, high (low) demand is more likely to be associated with high
(low) production resource, and thus the production resource is less constraining for
the high demand scenario. On average, this higher correlation brings production
stage optimal structure closer to the resource-unconstrained case (referring to
panel (a) of Figure 3.2), thus the higher correlation is more beneficial for the firm.
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3.3.2 Sensitivity to Demand Variability - Comparison with
the Resource-unconstrained Benchmark
In this section, we investigate how demand variability fb affects the optimal
capacity investment level and corresponding expected profit. In examining
the demand variability, we make a comparison with the sensitivity result of a
benchmark model where the production resource is always ample for the firm
to proceed the production. We will provide the effect of demand variability on
optimal capacity level and corresponding expected profit of benchmark model, so
as to see the changes in insight by introducing the production resource uncertainty
comparing with the literature.
To show the sensitivity results of benchmark model, we first identify the
optimal strategy. In this case, the production decisions is made with no constraint
on the amount of production resource. Tracing the literature, Van Mieghem and
Dada (1999) introduce price and production postponement strategy to capacity-
production framework that is identical to the benchmark model. Specifically, the
benchmark model is formulated as two-stage problem, the first stage problem
is max
 ≥0
ΠD ( ) = max
 ≥0
{







, where ‘D’ denotes that the








(b − 1@)@ − H@
}
showing that the production resource constraint V/H
no longer exists. The optimal strategy of this benchmark model is presented in
Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Strategy of Benchmark Model)






0, if b ∈ [0, H]
b−H
21 , if b ∈ (H, H + 21 ]
 , if b ∈ (H + 21 , ∞) .
The corresponding expected profit in capacity-investment stage is













2. Optimal capacity investment level is






 * (l), otherwise.
The proof of this Lemma 1 is skipped due to its similarity to the proof of
Theorem 1 and 2. Not surprisingly, the optimal production strategy allocation of
the state space is the same aswhat shows in the panel (a) of the Figure 3.2, where the
strategy only depends on demand realization. For the optimal capacity investment
level, the no investment strategy has the same unit capacity cost condition as what
in Theorem 2. Also, under condition Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]






the optimal capacity level for both basic model and benchmark model is  * .
According to above Lemma 1, the effect of demand variability of benchmark
model is introduced in Proposition 2. In line with Assumption 2 on (b̃, Ṽ), the
distribution of b̃ used for proving Proposition 2 is normally distribution with
mean `b and variance f2b .
Proposition 2 (Impact of fb on  * and ΠD ( *)) When the production resource
of the firm is large enough, the influence of demand variability on optimal capacity
investment level and optimal expected profit are summarized as follows:
1. Resource-unconstrained capacity level  * is strictly increasing in fb;
2. Optimal profit ΠD ( *) is strictly increasing in fb .
From Proposition 2, we obtain that higher demand variability is, higher
resource-unconstrained capacity level and corresponding optimal expected profit
are. As increasing demand variability means more low/high demand intercept
realizations, the intuition of the results are developed by understanding how these
low or high realizations of demand affect the optimal capacity investment level
and the profitability.
Firstly, we discuss the intuition underlying part 1, Proposition 2, that is the
impact on the resource-unconstrained capacity level  * . We define the right-hand
unit normal linear loss function as ! (C) :=
∫ ∞
C
(I − C)q(I)3I, which is a function
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monotonically decreasing in C. As for demand intercept b̃ is normally distributed
in accordance with Assumption 2, we have close form of resource-unconstrained
capacity level, that is  * = `b−H+fb !
−1 (l/fb )
21 , where !
−1 is the inverse function
of ! (C). Given a fixed unit cost of capacity investment, the optimal capacity
investment level changes the same way as the marginal revenue of capacity
investment changes in demand variability, as shown by Equation (3.3). Since
marginal revenue is not sensitive to low demand realization and larger in high
demand realization, it increases in demand variability.
For the intuition of Proposition 2 part 2 result, more demand variability
is beneficial due to the price-demand relationship ?(@) = b − 1@ where price
is responsive to product quantity demanded, particularly when the production
quantity is decided after the resolution of uncertainties. The reason behind is
developed by Chod and Rudi (2005): on the one hand, the firm can charge a high
price when capacity is constraining and demand realization is high; on the other
hand, the firm can adjust a low price to have more products sold in the case of
low demand realization. To summarize, demand variability is beneficial to both
marginal revenue of investing capacity and optimal expected profitability of the
firm.
In contract to the effect of demand variability fb on resource-unconstrained
capacity  * , the resource-constrained capacity level   is not always mono-
tonically increasing in fb . Proposition 3 and Conjecture 1 together present that
the resource-constrained capacity   increases in demand variability fb when
the correlation satisfies d ∈ [0, 1); the resource-constrained capacity   first
decreases then increases in fb when d ∈ (−1, 0).




















































The impact of the
demand variability fb on the resource-constrained capacity level is:
1. If d ≥ 0, then   increases in fb;





Additional to analytical sensitivity results in Proposition 3, it is not analytically
tractable to prove the effect of fb on   when d ∈ (−1, 0). Under condition d ∈
(−1, 0), we can prove the sign of 3 
3fb





< 0 and 3 
3fb













Furthermore, we observe the following pattern described in Conjecture 1 through
18,225 numerical instances introduced in Section 3.4.1.
Conjecture 1 (Impact of fb on   when d < 0) When d ∈ (−1, 0), there ex-
ists a unique f 
b





Noting that we purposely define the fb threshold in Conjecture 1 as f b
which is the same notation as what’s in Proposition 3 part 2 in order to show the
continuity of the sensitivity results. A graphical representation of the effect of fb
on   in Proposition 3 as well as in Conjecture 1 is shown in Figure 3.3.
The effect of fb on   is illustrated by comparing with the effect of demand
variability on resource-unconstrained capacity level  * in benchmark model. The
result is presented in part 1 of Proposition 2 showing that resource-unconstrained
capacity level always increases in the demand variability. In contrast, in basic
model, Proposition 3 and Conjecture 1 show that demand variability would lead
to a negative effect on resource-constrained capacity level under certain condition
and this deviation of the impact is driven by the correlation between demand and
production resource. Specifically, when the correlation is negative, the result
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Figure 3.3: Effect of demand variability fb on resource-constrained capacity
level  .



















(a) l = 1

















(b) l = 5


















(c) l = 10
Therein, the baseline scenario is 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4, fV = 16%`V and
d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}, with fb as percentage of `b from
2% to 30%.
deviates from the traditional understanding, that is, higher demand variability
would lead to lower optimal capacity investment level   when fb < f b .
Otherwise, the resource-constrained capacity   increases in demand variability,
which is in line with the sensitivity result of benchmark case in Proposition 2.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 and Conjecture 1 is developed by under-
standing why the correlation is the key driver for the impact of demand variability
on resource-constrained capacity level. To undertake the fact that the correlation
between demand and production resource uncertainties is vital, the intuition of the
result is discussed with classification of no correlation, positive correlation and
negative correlation, since changing the sign of correlation changes the behaviour
of marginal revenue in optimality condition (3.4). When there is no correlation
i.e. d = 0, the financial flexibility level is not influenced by demand uncertainty,
as a result, demand variability has the same effect for optimal capacity level in
both models, to put it in another way, we can simply write the optimality condition
(3.4) asl = Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
} ∫ ∞
H+21  (b−H−21 
) 5b (b)3b. When the correlation
is positive i.e. d > 0, high demand realization is associated with high production
resource, or equivalently, when additional capacity is available because of the
high demand, the production resource is less constraining comparing with no
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correlation case. As a result, financial flexibility level is high and thus marginal
revenue is high so that the the optimal capacity level is increasing in demand
variability. When the demand and production resource is negatively correlated
i.e. d < 0, as demand variability increasing, more and more high (low) demand
associated with low (high) production resource, the financial flexibility level
is therefore getting lower gradually. Even though basic model inherits higher
demand variability higher marginal revenue trend from basic model marginal
revenue similar part, it only dominates the financial flexibility level decreasing
trend when demand variability is larger than a threshold. Our result provides
a new result by illustrating that higher demand variability does not necessarily
result in higher capacity investment level when the uncertain demand is correlated
with the production resource. It depends on the sign of the correlation as well as
the magnitude of the demand variability.
Next to that, the impact of demand variability on the optimal expected profit
is summarized in Proposition 4 in comparison with part 2 of Proposition 2. Also,
we find that the impact of demand variability on the optimal expected profit
shares a similar pattern as that on the resource-constrained capacity level.
Proposition 4 (Impact of fb on Π( )) In terms of the impact of the demand
intercept variability fb on the optimal expected profit, we have the following
results:
1. If d ≥ 0, Π( ) increases in fb;
2. If d < 0, there exists a unique fΠ
b
such that Π( ) decreases in fb when
fb ≤ fΠb ; and Π( ) increases in fb when fb > fΠb .
The sensitivity of Π( ) on demand variability is represented graphically in
Figure 3.4. The impact of demand variability on the optimal expected profit in
Proposition 4 is illustrated by comparing with Proposition 2 part 2. When the
correlation is negative, different from the benchmark model, the result shows




Figure 3.4: Effect of demand variability fb on optimal expected profit Π( ).
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(c) l = 10
The baseline scenario is 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4, fV = 16%`V , fb is picked
as the percentage of `b ranging from 2% to 30% and
d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}.
the profit decreases in demand variability, above which the profit increases in
demand variability; when the correlation is non-negative, the profit increasing in
demand variability holds in both basic model and benchmark model.
The intuition of the result is discussed with classification of no correlation,
positive correlation and negative correlation. We first discuss the result when
the correlation is non-negative (part 1 of Proposition 4). If that is the case, it is
not hard to see that the optimal expected profit in the second stage is convex in
the demand intercept, consequently, the optimal profit increases in the demand
variability. Secondly, when the demand and production resource is negatively
correlated (part 2 of Proposition 4), high (low) demand realization is associated
with low (high) production resource realization, indicating that the production
resource is more significantly constraining the production quantity when the
market demand is higher.
Pursuing the intuition for negative correlation case (part 2 of Proposition 4)
further, as demand variability increases from zero, we would observe more high
and low demand realizations. Regardless of the effect of production resource, the
resulting higher demand realization would continue to contribute more revenue
by responsive pricing, and the resulting lower demand would lead to revenue
loss because of the demand shrinkage. However, when the variability is smaller
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than certain threshold, comparing with the revenue loss brought by the lower
demand realizations, the extra revenue brought by higher demand realizations
is less significant due to the association with tightening production resource
realizations. Note that the revenue loss by the the lower demand realizations
is diminishing as the variability increases while the revenue gain by the higher
demand realizations keeps increasing in the demand variability. Therefore, when
the demand variability is large enough, the gain would dominate the loss and thus
the optimal expected revenue starts to increase in the demand variability.
3.3.3 Sensitivity to Production Resource Variability
In this section, we conduct sensitivity analyses to study how manufacturing
firms should adjust their capacity investment level as a response to changing
production resource variability. Also how production resource variability affects
the profitability of the firm is analysed. Starting from the impact of production
resource variability fV on resource-constrained capacity level  , Proposition
5 characterizes this effect through unit capacity investment cost threshold and
correlation threshold.
Proposition 5 (Impact of fV on  ) Define


























(d). The impact of
fV on   is:






, then   strictly increases in fV. Note that l V (−1) =



















(l)) = l such that
(a) if d > d 
V
(l), then   strictly increases in fV;
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(b) if d = d 
V
(l), then   = `V/H, which is constant to fV;
(c) if d < d 
V
(l), then   strictly decreases in fV;
Noting that d 
V
(l) increases in l.






,   strictly decreases in fV.
Proposition 5 demonstrates that resource-constrained capacity level   is
monotone in production resource variability fV, and whether it is increasing or
decreasing in fV critically depends on the unit capacity cost and the correlation
between demand and production resource uncertainties. Specifically, when the
unit capacity investment cost l is low enough (part 1 of Proposition 5), higher
production resource variability results in higher resource-constrained capacity
level; when the capacity investment cost is sufficiently high (part 3 of Proposition
5), as production resource variability increases, the resource-constrained capacity
level decreases. When the capacity investment cost is intermediate (part 2
of Proposition 5), the impact of fV on   crucially depends on value of the
correlation d. In particular, there exists a threshold value of d denoted by
d 
V
(l), above which the resource-constrained capacity level increases in fV; and
below which the capacity level decreases in fV. For visualizing Proposition 5,
Figure 3.5 graphically shows the impact of production resource variability on
resource-constrained capacity level, where three panels have different scenarios
of unit capacity cost.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of production resource variability fV on resource-constrained
capacity level  .


















(a) l = 1 < l 
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(c) l = 10 > l 
V
(1)
The figures are depicted using baseline data 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fb = 16%`b , fV is picked as the percentage of `V ranging from 2% to 30% and and






For the effect of production resource variability fV on resource-constrained
capacity level   presented in Proposition 5, we illustrate intuition behind in
sequence of its part 1, part 3 and part 2. Since the effect critically depends on
unit capacity cost l and correlation between demand and production resource
uncertainties d, we first summarize the effects of l and d on   so as to
understand how l and d jointly shape the impact of fV on  . It is easy to
verify that   decreases in the unit investment cost l (because of 3 
3l
< 0).
It is consistent with the intuition that when the unit capacity investment cost
is high (low), the firm invests small (large) amount of capacity to control over-
investment (under-investment) cost. For the effect of d on  , the monotone
increasing relationship is illustrated in Proposition 1 part 1. Observing from part
1 (part 3) of Proposition 5, the unit capacity investment cost is sufficiently low
(high) respectively, the resulting under-investment (over-investment) effect is so
significant that the effect of the correlation is negligible. We first discuss part 1
and part 3.
In part 1 of Proposition 5, the unit capacity investment is sufficiently low so
that controlling under-investment cost of capacity becomes the most important
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consideration. The reason is that investing large amount of capacity so as to prevent
production process being constrained by capacity is less costly more profitable in
terms of capturing potential demand. Under this condition, we discuss the impact
of more high and low production resource realizations on resource-constrained
capacity level respectively as the production resource variability increases. More
high production resource realizations service the same role as high capacity
level in terms of relaxing production process constraint so as to satisfy potential
high demand. Even through more low production resource realizations constrain
the production resulting more leftover capacity, it is not costly due to low unit
capacity investment cost. To control under-investment cost of capacity, the firm
would invest in more capacity when production resource variability is higher.
In part 3 of Proposition 5, the unit capacity investment is sufficiently high
such that the over-investment cost is unbearable, the firm invests small amount of
capacity and refer the production resource to be less volatile. As the production
resource variability increases, there are more high and low production resource
realizations. High resource do not affect the capacity investment decision, yet low
resource constrain production process and therefore increases over-investment cost
of capacity. To control the over-investment cost, resource-constrained capacity
investment level should be decreasing in production resource variability.
To understand the result in part 2 of Proposition 5, note that the effect of
intermediate unit capacity cost l on resource-constrained capacity   does not
dominate the effect of the correlation between demand and production resource
uncertainties d any more. The value of d determines how   changes in fV.
Therefore, we recall the impact of d on  : as the correlation increases, the
revenue margin of investing capacity increases due to the increase of production
resource flexibility level Pr
{
Ṽ > H 
b̃}, as a result,   increases. The trade-
off between over- and under- investment is observed from production resource
flexibility. When production resource flexibility level is high (in the case of
high correlation d > d 
V
(l)), due to relevantly ample production resource, it is
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more likely to capture high demand. Therefore the firm should pay attention to
control under-investment cost by invest in moderately large amount of capacity.
As production resource variability increases, more high resource realizations
resulting in a higher production resource flexibility level so that the firm should
invest in more capacity. When production resource flexibility level is low (in
the case d < d 
V
(l)), on expectation, the production resource is not enough,
the firm should invest moderately small amount of capacity and prevent further
over-investment cost as more low production resource realizations caused by
production resource variability increasing.
In summary, the impact of production resource variability on resource-
constrained capacity level crucially depends on the unit capacity investment
cost and the correlation between demand and production resource uncertainties.
Balancing over-investment and under-investment of capacity so as to control cost
is the key factor that explains the impact of fV on  . Then we introduce the
impact of fV on the optimal expected profit Π( ) of the basic model.































= 0. For any given correlation and unit capacity
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, then Π( ) decreases in
fV.









, then there exists a
threshold fΠ
V
(l, d) ∈ (0, dfb H21 ] such that Π( 




(l, d); and Π( ) decreases in fV when fV > fΠV (l, d).
Proposition 6 presents the impact of production resource variability on optimal
expected profit and this result also crucially depends on unit capacity investment
44
Figure 3.6: Effect of production resource fV on optimal expected profit Π( ).
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(c) l = 10
The baseline data applied are 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4, fb = 16%`b , fV is
picked as the percentage of `V ranging from 2% to 30% and
d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}.





(l) respectively, such that only when l < lΠ
V
(1) and d > dΠ
V
(l)
(condition in part 2 of Proposition 6) firm’s optimal expected profit first increases
then decreases in production resource variability; otherwise (condition in part 1
of the Proposition 6), the profit monotonically decreases in production resource
variability. A graphic representation of this proposition is shown in Figure 3.6.
Intuitively, variability of production resource may harm the firm’s profit
as result showed in part 1 of Proposition 6. One supporting example is when
there is no correlation between demand and production resource uncertainties,
i.e. d = 0, the optimal profit in the production stage c∗( , b, V) is concave
in the realization of production resource and thus higher resource variability
would result in lower expected profit in the capacity investment stage according
to Jensen’s inequality. Also, high volatility of production resource is more
harmful for the firm’s profitability fits business insight since on the one hand,
more high production resource realizations may not be beneficial to the firm due
to tightening capacity in the production process, on the other hand, more low
production resource realizations may severely hurt firm’s profit because the not
only capacity is over-invested but also product demand is not satisfied.
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However, in part 2 of Proposition 6, we obtain different pattern, indicating
that the optimal expected profit increases in production resource variability when
the production resource variability is less than a threshold value fΠ
V
(l, d), the
correlation is sufficiently high and the unit capacity investment cost is sufficiently
low. To understand the result we first show how the low value of unit capacity
cost l impacts the optimal expected profit. For one thing, a a very low l results
in a very high resource-constrained capacity level so that the production process
is almost always constrained by production resource, for another, optimal profit
Π( ) decreases in l meaning that over-investment cost is negligible. Then
we recall that when the demand and production resource correlation is very
high, high production resource realizations are more likely to associated with
high demand realizations, which gives more room to satisfy high demand so as
to reduce under-investment cost, or equivalently to capture higher profit. But
as production resource variability increases to a value larger than fΠ
V
(l, d),
more production resource realizations tend to take more extreme values, i.e.
the value is either too high such that the realizations fill into Ω2 or too low
such that the realizations fill into Ω0. Since high production resource doesn’t
increases production quantity when uncertainties are realized in Ω2 and the firm
doesn’t produce when uncertainties are realized inΩ0, higher production resource
variability starts to hurt profitability of the firm.
So far we have discussed the impact of production resource variability on
resource-constrained capacity level and the corresponding expected profit in
Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 respectively. We find that the critical unit
capacity investment cost thresholds as a function of the correlation between




(d) < l 
V
(d) < lmax, ∀d > 0.
This corollary presents the comparison between the unit capacity cost threshold
l 
V
(d) in Proposition 5 and lΠ
V
(d) in Proposition 6 given the correlation d.
46
Recalling that in Proposition 5,   increases in fV when unit capacity cost
satisfies l < l 
V
(d);   decreases in fV otherwise; in Proposition 6, optimal
profit Π( ) first increases then decreases in fV when unit capacity cost satisfies
l < lΠ
V
(d); Π( ) decreases in fV otherwise. The intuition is that even through
there is a wide range of (l, d) ∈
{
(l, d) |l < l 
V
(d), d ∈ (−1, 1)
}
under which
a higher production resource variability increases optimal capacity level, only a
proper subset of above (l, d) set, denoted by
{
(l, d) |l < lΠ
V
(d), d ∈ (0, 1)
}
,
is the range under which higher production resource variability is profitable when
production resource variability is less than a certain threshold.
3.4 Profitability-loss
In this section, we address the third research question by extending our analyses
of the impact of the demand and production resource uncertainties on the
profitability-loss incurred once the production resource uncertainty is ignored
in choosing the capacity investment level. Since the expected profit taking
into consideration of the production resource is Π(·), we define the rate of the
profitability-loss due to miss-specifying capacity level as ΔΠ := Π( 
)−Π( * )
Π( ) .
Recalling that  * is resource-unconstrained capacity level that the firm would
choose if the production resource is ignored. Therefore, the expected profit with
miss-specified capacity level isΠ( *).   is resource-constrained capacity level
that is the optimal capacity investment level of the basic model. For the ease of the
analysis, we bring the bivariate normal distribution assumption back and limit unit











The following lemma provides the basic theoretical support of the existence of
profitability-loss.




This result fits the standard folklore that 1) if the firm has a sufficiently
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large production resource, the firm would make higher capacity investment
and 2) the investment project is not proceed as profitable as planned if the
firm has insufficient production resource for production. Briefly speaking, the
firm would incur an optimality gap, that is called profitability-loss, when the
firm mistakenly chooses higher capacity investment level by ignoring uncertain
production resource. Due to the optimality of   we have ΔΠ > 0, in addition,
ΔΠ may greater than 1 in the case of Π( *) < 0. Noting that above inequalities
in Lemma 2 also hold without Distribution Assumption 2 when the range of unit
capacity cost is 0 < l < Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]
.
In analysing the sensitivity, results are analytically and numerically provided,
specifically, we show that under what conditions the profitability-loss is significant
by examining the effects of uncertainties on this profitability-loss. At the same
time, we use extensive numerical experiments to show the results that are not
analytically proven. In the following, we investigate the impact of the uncertainty
parameters (d, fb and fV) on the profitability-loss. We first present a proposition
showing how profitability-loss changes in the correlation between demand and
production resource uncertainties.
Proposition 7 (Impact of d on Profitability-loss)
1. Profitability-loss ΔΠ is decreasing in d;
2. The lower bound of profitability-loss is lim
d→1
ΔΠ.
Proposition 7 demonstrates that a high the correlation between demand and
production resource uncertainties results in a low profitability-loss. First of
all,  * is not a function of the correlation. Base on this, we discussion the
general insight. On the one hand, a higher correlation decreases the difference
between product quantity provided by realized production resource V
H
and the
internal optimal production quantity b−H21 , thus,  
 could be closer to  * as the
correlation increases. On the other hand, from the proof of Proposition 1, we
obtain that mΠ( )
m 
increases in d, meaning that as d increasing, the decreasing
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trend of Π( ) on  when  >   (d) tends to be more flat. As a result, the
rate of profitability-loss between optimal expected profit and the profit without
considering production-loss is shrink when d increases.
In analysing the impact of production resource variability on the profitability-
loss, we provide following analytical result.









(d). The sensitivity result is calibrated as
follows:
1. when l ≥ l* , ΔΠ strictly increases in fV;












The first part of Proposition 8 shows that when unit capacity cost is higher than
l* , then the profitability-loss increases in production resource variability. The
part 2 of Proposition 8 is for theoretically supporting Conjecture 2. Specifically,
second part indicates when the unit capacity cost is lower than this threshold l*
and the correlation between demand and production resource is positive, we only
know that the profitability-loss decreases in production resource variability when







Analytical explanation of part 1 of Proposition 8 is as follows. First of all,
 * is not sensitive to production resource variability fV by definition. For
the effect of fV on  , when unit capacity cost is sufficiently large,   (fV)
decreases in fV as discussed in part 3 of Proposition 5. As a result, the
difference between two capacity levels  * −   (fV) increases in fV. Also,
mΠ( )
m 
decreases in fV when l < l* , which implies that as  * −   (fV)
increases Π
(




  (fV), fV
)
also increases due to sharper decreasing
trend of mΠ( )
m 
caused by increasing fV. The general insight is twofold. For one
thing, similar as what we discussed in Section 3.3.3, that is, the need for control
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over-investment cost outweighs the need for under-investment cost when unit
capacity cost is sufficiently large. For another, higher the production resource
variability more unprofitable the optimal expected profit in basic model is. The
part 2 of Proposition is the analytical support of Conjecture 2 introduced in
Section 4.4.2. In obtaining conjectures of sensitivity of profitability-loss, we
conduct numerical experiment and the numerical study design is introduced in
the following section.
3.4.1 Numerical Study Design
The numerical study is conducted with 18, 225 numerical instances. A wide
range of parameter values extended around the baseline scenario: the cor-
relation between demand and production resource uncertainties takes value
d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}; unit production cost
is standardized as 1 = 1, H = 1; the unit capacity investment cost l ∈ {1, 5, 10};
mean value of demand uncertainty has range `b ∈ {14H, 16H, 18H}; mean value




21 for each `b ; the demand
variability fb ∈ [2%, 30%] is the percentage of `b with 2%-unit increments, and
similarly, production resource variability fV ∈ [2%, 30%] is also picked as the
percentage of `V, varying with 2%-unit increments. For this numerical study
design, we have several specifications in what follows.





21 , indicates the quantity of products processed by mean production
resource value equals to half of the product quantity that denotes the internal
optimal production quantity given demand intercept materialized as its average
level. In other words, this equation means, on expectation, the production resource
is short to satisfy the product demand. On count of widely studied less- or non-
resource constrained firms’ capacity management in the OM literature, we would
not focus on the case where the production resource is high on expectation.
Secondly, we choose the standard deviations of the distribution carefully so
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that the probability of having negative realizations is negligible, particularly, the
coefficient of variation no more than 30%. This is because, as a matter of fact,
neither demand intercept nor production resource should be realized in negative
values even if we follow Assumption 2 that their joint distribution is bivariate
normally distributed. In this way, the non-negativity of the (b̃, Ṽ) distribution is
unproblematic.
Lastly, we carefully choose three values of unit capacity investment cost
l ∈ {1, 5, 10}. Mathematically, l should be less than lmax in order to have
positive  ∗. Defined in Section 3.3, lmax is an unit capacity cost threshold such
that  ∗ =   when l < lmax and  ∗ = 0 otherwise. As lmax is a function of
1, H, d, `b , fb , `V and fV, l should be less than the lowest lmax for all instances
of {1, H, d, `b , fb , `V, fV}. Denoting lmax as the lowest value mentioned above,
we can safely pick l less than lmax = 12.9888. In addition, the early stage unit
capacity cost is usually more expensive than unit production cost, that is l > H,
as we fix H = 1, the capacity cost l should no less than 1.
We numerically compute the percentage profitability-loss ΔΠ × 100% after
obtaining both resource-unconstrained capacity level * and resource-constrained
capacity level   and optimal expected profit in basic model (Equation (3.2))
using standard MatLab optimization procedures. The baseline scenario for
sensitivity results described in Section 3.3 is based on the numerical study design
by calculating optimal capacity and corresponding expected profit for all d.
3.4.2 Profitability-loss under Different Production Resource
Variability
Continuing on the discussion regarding to the impact of fV on Profitability-loss
in Proposition 8, we perform complementary computational experiments. We
numerically calculate the average profitability-lossΔΠ×100% across all scenarios
fixing fV/`V, d and l and report results in Table 3.1. Similarly, we calculate the
average profitability-loss ΔΠ × 100% fixing only fV/`V and d in Table 3.2. We
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draw a conjecture according to Proposition 8 together with observations in Table
3.1 and Table 3.2. Specifically, we consistently observe following pattern in each
scenario:
Conjecture 2 Observing from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 and according to Propo-
sition 8, there exists a threshold f%!V (l, d) decreasing in l and increasing in
d, such that Profitability-loss ΔΠ decreases in fV when fV < f%!V (l, d) and
increases in fV when fV > f%!V (l, d).
This conjecture shows that the impact of production resource variability on
profitability-loss is not always monotone. There exists a production resource
variability threshold f%!V (l, d) which critically depends on unit capacity cost
and correlation. Specifically, when production resource variability is below this
threshold, profitability-loss decreases as production resource variability increases;
when production resource variability is above this threshold, profitability-loss
increases in production resource variability. In a special case that unit capacity
cost is no less than l* , the threshold f%!V (l, d) equals to 0. Then, we discuss
observations from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 for supporting the conjecture.
For the observation of Table 3.1, we start from high unit capacity cost scenario
Table 3.1 (c) l = 10. In line with part 1 of the Proposition 8 where the maximal
l* among all instances equals to 8.6334 that is less than given value of unit
capacity cost 10, the profitability-loss increases in production resource variability
fV. And the value of profitability-loss is in a very low range 0% − 8.8%. In
Table 3.1 (b) where unit capacity cost is moderate, we observe profitability-loss
decreases in fV when fV is smaller than a threshold, which is in accordance
with part 2 of Proposition 8. The value of profitability-loss is relevantly high
14% − 26.9%. For low unit capacity cost scenario l = 1 in Table 3.1 (a), the
profitability-loss span the range of 5.2% − 10%. In this case, as fV increases
profitability-loss is lower, which implies that the production resource variability
threshold f%!V (l, d) may go to∞.
An additional observation from comparing three sub-tables of Table 3.1 is
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−0.995 −0.75 −0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.995
2%`V 10.026% 9.987% 9.951% 9.919% 9.89% 9.863% 9.838% 9.815% 9.793%
4%`V 9.887% 9.809% 9.738% 9.674% 9.615% 9.561% 9.511% 9.465% 9.422%
6%`V 9.757% 9.639% 9.532% 9.435% 9.346% 9.265% 9.19% 9.121% 9.058%
8%`V 9.635% 9.477% 9.333% 9.203% 9.084% 8.976% 8.876% 8.784% 8.701%
10%`V 9.521% 9.322% 9.141% 8.977% 8.829% 8.693% 8.568% 8.454% 8.351%
12%`V 9.416% 9.175% 8.957% 8.759% 8.58% 8.416% 8.267% 8.131% 8.007%
14%`V 9.318% 9.036% 8.78% 8.548% 8.338% 8.146% 7.972% 7.814% 7.671%
16%`V 9.228% 8.905% 8.61% 8.344% 8.103% 7.883% 7.684% 7.503% 7.341%
18%`V 9.147% 8.781% 8.448% 8.148% 7.874% 7.626% 7.401% 7.198% 7.018%
20%`V 9.073% 8.665% 8.294% 7.958% 7.653% 7.376% 7.126% 6.9% 6.701%
22%`V 9.008% 8.557% 8.147% 7.776% 7.439% 7.132% 6.856% 6.609% 6.39%
24%`V 8.95% 8.457% 8.007% 7.601% 7.231% 6.896% 6.593% 6.323% 6.086%
26%`V 8.901% 8.364% 7.875% 7.433% 7.031% 6.666% 6.337% 6.044% 5.789%
28%`V 8.859% 8.278% 7.75% 7.272% 6.838% 6.443% 6.088% 5.772% 5.498%
30%`V 8.824% 8.2% 7.632% 7.119% 6.652% 6.227% 5.845% 5.507% 5.214%
(a) l = 1
fV
ΔΠ d
−0.995 −0.75 −0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.995
2%`V 26.954% 26.786% 26.618% 26.455% 26.296% 26.142% 25.994% 25.851% 25.718%
4%`V 27.007% 26.671% 26.335% 26.008% 25.691% 25.383% 25.086% 24.801% 24.535%
6%`V 27.077% 26.572% 26.068% 25.577% 25.099% 24.637% 24.192% 23.766% 23.368%
8%`V 27.166% 26.491% 25.818% 25.161% 24.524% 23.908% 23.314% 22.747% 22.219%
10%`V 27.278% 26.432% 25.589% 24.768% 23.972% 23.203% 22.463% 21.757% 21.102%
12%`V 27.417% 26.4% 25.389% 24.407% 23.455% 22.537% 21.656% 20.816% 20.039%
14%`V 27.587% 26.402% 25.226% 24.086% 22.984% 21.924% 20.907% 19.941% 19.05%
16%`V 27.793% 26.441% 25.104% 23.812% 22.567% 21.37% 20.227% 19.142% 18.145%
18%`V 28.038% 26.521% 25.027% 23.589% 22.206% 20.882% 19.619% 18.425% 17.331%
20%`V 28.323% 26.644% 24.998% 23.417% 21.904% 20.458% 19.084% 17.788% 16.605%
22%`V 28.651% 26.812% 25.015% 23.297% 21.658% 20.098% 18.619% 17.229% 15.966%
24%`V 29.023% 27.024% 25.079% 23.228% 21.467% 19.797% 18.22% 16.743% 15.405%
26%`V 29.439% 27.281% 25.189% 23.206% 21.327% 19.552% 17.881% 16.323% 14.916%
28%`V 29.902% 27.582% 25.344% 23.23% 21.236% 19.358% 17.599% 15.962% 14.492%
30%`V 30.411% 27.928% 25.542% 23.298% 21.189% 19.212% 17.366% 15.656% 14.126%
(b) l = 5
fV
ΔΠ d
−0.995 −0.75 −0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.995
2%`V 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
4%`V 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
6%`V 0.001% 0.001% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
8%`V 0.025% 0.021% 0.017% 0.013% 0.01% 0.007% 0.004% 0.003% 0.002%
10%`V 0.132% 0.112% 0.094% 0.076% 0.059% 0.045% 0.033% 0.023% 0.016%
12%`V 0.349% 0.303% 0.257% 0.213% 0.173% 0.136% 0.104% 0.076% 0.056%
14%`V 0.684% 0.597% 0.512% 0.431% 0.355% 0.286% 0.224% 0.171% 0.128%
16%`V 1.142% 1.002% 0.864% 0.734% 0.611% 0.499% 0.398% 0.309% 0.237%
18%`V 1.732% 1.524% 1.32% 1.127% 0.945% 0.778% 0.627% 0.495% 0.385%
20%`V 2.463% 2.171% 1.886% 1.615% 1.362% 1.128% 0.917% 0.73% 0.574%
22%`V 3.347% 2.953% 2.57% 2.206% 1.866% 1.553% 1.27% 1.018% 0.808%
24%`V 4.398% 3.884% 3.383% 2.909% 2.467% 2.06% 1.691% 1.364% 1.09%
26%`V 5.638% 4.98% 4.34% 3.736% 3.173% 2.656% 2.188% 1.773% 1.424%
28%`V 7.088% 6.259% 5.455% 4.699% 3.996% 3.351% 2.767% 2.251% 1.815%
30%`V 8.769% 7.74% 6.745% 5.812% 4.946% 4.152% 3.437% 2.803% 2.269%
(c) l = 10
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Table 3.2: Effect of production resource variability fV on profitability loss ΔΠ
fV
ΔΠ d
−0.995 −0.75 −0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.995
2%`V 12.327% 12.258% 12.19% 12.125% 12.062% 12.002% 11.944% 11.889% 11.837%
4%`V 12.298% 12.16% 12.024% 11.894% 11.769% 11.648% 11.532% 11.422% 11.319%
6%`V 12.278% 12.071% 11.867% 11.671% 11.482% 11.301% 11.127% 10.962% 10.809%
8%`V 12.276% 11.996% 11.722% 11.459% 11.206% 10.963% 10.732% 10.511% 10.307%
10%`V 12.31% 11.955% 11.608% 11.274% 10.953% 10.647% 10.355% 10.078% 9.823%
12%`V 12.394% 11.959% 11.534% 11.126% 10.736% 10.363% 10.009% 9.674% 9.368%
14%`V 12.53% 12.012% 11.506% 11.022% 10.559% 10.119% 9.701% 9.309% 8.95%
16%`V 12.721% 12.116% 11.526% 10.963% 10.427% 9.917% 9.436% 8.985% 8.574%
18%`V 12.972% 12.275% 11.599% 10.954% 10.342% 9.762% 9.216% 8.706% 8.244%
20%`V 13.287% 12.494% 11.726% 10.997% 10.306% 9.654% 9.042% 8.473% 7.96%
22%`V 13.668% 12.774% 11.911% 11.093% 10.321% 9.594% 8.915% 8.285% 7.721%
24%`V 14.124% 13.121% 12.156% 11.246% 10.388% 9.584% 8.835% 8.143% 7.527%
26%`V 14.659% 13.541% 12.468% 11.458% 10.51% 9.625% 8.802% 8.047% 7.376%
28%`V 15.283% 14.04% 12.85% 11.734% 10.69% 9.717% 8.818% 7.995% 7.268%
30%`V 16.001% 14.623% 13.307% 12.076% 10.929% 9.864% 8.883% 7.989% 7.203%
Figure 3.7: Effect of production resource variability fV on profitability loss ΔΠ.

















(a) l = 1




















(b) l = 5





















(c) l = 10
Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fb = 16%`b and fV is the percentage of `V which are
{2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, 12%, 14%, 16%, 18%, 20%, 22%, 24%, 26%, 28%, 30%}.
that, as unit capacity cost increases, the production resource variability threshold
f%!V (l, d) decreases. To further understand how correlation shapes the impact of
production resource variability on the profitability-loss, we calculate the average
profitability-loss by only fixing fV/`V and d. The result is summarized in Table
3.2, in which we observe that as correlation increasing, production resource
variability threshold f%!V (l, d) increases.
So far we have explained how we draw the Conjecture 2 from both analytical
Proposition and numerical experiments. Now, in complementing intuition of
the impact of profitability-loss on production resource variability, we consider
this impact in a low unit capacity cost scenario. We know that in this case,
there exists a production resource variability threshold f%!V (l, d) critically
depends on unit capacity cost and correlation. This is because the impact of
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Table 3.3: Effect of demand variability fb on profitability loss ΔΠ.
fb
ΔΠ d
−0.995 −0.75 −0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.995
2%`b 10.198% 10.13% 10.06% 9.991% 9.923% 9.855% 9.787% 9.72% 9.655%
4%`b 10.489% 10.349% 10.207% 10.068% 9.93% 9.795% 9.661% 9.53% 9.403%
6%`b 10.812% 10.596% 10.38% 10.169% 9.962% 9.759% 9.561% 9.367% 9.182%
8%`b 11.166% 10.871% 10.578% 10.293% 10.016% 9.747% 9.486% 9.232% 8.992%
10%`b 11.547% 11.171% 10.799% 10.439% 10.091% 9.755% 9.432% 9.121% 8.828%
12%`b 11.958% 11.498% 11.044% 10.608% 10.189% 9.787% 9.403% 9.036% 8.695%
14%`b 12.404% 11.857% 11.321% 10.807% 10.317% 9.849% 9.405% 8.985% 8.597%
16%`b 12.89% 12.254% 11.635% 11.044% 10.482% 9.949% 9.446% 8.974% 8.542%
18%`b 13.421% 12.695% 11.992% 11.323% 10.69% 10.092% 9.531% 9.009% 8.536%
20%`b 13.998% 13.182% 12.394% 11.648% 10.944% 10.283% 9.664% 9.092% 8.579%
22%`b 14.621% 13.714% 12.842% 12.019% 11.245% 10.52% 9.846% 9.225% 8.674%
24%`b 15.291% 14.292% 13.335% 12.436% 11.592% 10.805% 10.075% 9.407% 8.818%
26%`b 16.005% 14.915% 13.873% 12.897% 11.984% 11.135% 10.35% 9.635% 9.01%
28%`b 16.763% 15.581% 14.455% 13.402% 12.419% 11.508% 10.669% 9.909% 9.248%
30%`b 17.564% 16.289% 15.077% 13.947% 12.895% 11.923% 11.031% 10.225% 9.528%
production resource variability on both resource-constrained capacity   and
optimal expected profit in basic model Π( ) are characterized by unit capacity
cost and correlation, referring to Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 for details. In
this small unit capacity cost scenario, profitability-loss decreases in production
resource variability when production resource variability is less than the threshold
f%!V (l, d). This is because not only resource-constrained capacity level getting
closer to resource-unconstrained capacity level, but the expected profit in basic
model is less sensitivity to capacity investment level. As a result, we conclude
that either too low or too high production resource variability leads to a large
profitability-loss.
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3.4.3 Profitability-loss under Different Demand Variability
Then, we investigate the impact of demand variability fb on the profitability-loss
ΔΠ × 100%. Since the analytical result is intractable, we conduct numerical
experiment across all scenarios fixing fb/`b , d and report results in Table 3.3.
All entries denote the average profitability-loss with all numerical instances. In
addition, we underline the minimal value of each column, since we observe the
non-monotone trend of how profitability-loss changes in demand variability and
this demand variability threshold changes in the correlation d.
From this table, we first observe that given fixed demand variability fb ,
profitability-loss is decreasing in correlation d, which verify the Proposition
7 again. When d is low, profitability-loss is increasing in demand variability
and when d is high, this monotonicity does not hold anymore. In conclusion,
the observation from Table 3.3 about the impact of fb on profitability-loss is
summarized in following conjecture.
Conjecture 3 There exists a threshold f%!b (d) increasing in d, such that
1. when d > 0, ΔΠ decreases in fb when fb < f%!b (d), otherwise, it
increases in fb;
2. when d ≤ 0, ΔΠ increases in fb , or equivalently, f%!b (d) = 0.
The graphical exposition of the conjecture using baseline scenario is as follows:
Intuitively, how profitability-loss being affected by demand variability critically
depends on the impact of demand variability on resource-unconstrained capacity
level  * (part 1 of Proposition 2), resource-constrained capacity level   and
the expected profit function Π( ). As we obtain from Proposition 3 and 4, the
sign of correlation shapes the sensitivity results. We explain the intuitions in two
scenarios, negative correlation and positive correlation. Firstly, when the demand
and production resource is negatively correlated, both resource-constrained
capacity level and corresponding optimal expected profit in basic model first
decrease then increase in demand variability. Since resource-unconstrained
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Figure 3.8: Effect of demand variability fb on profitability loss ΔΠ.
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(b) l = 5




















(c) l = 10
Therein, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4, fV = 16%`V and fV is percentage of `V , where
the percentage set is
{2%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 10%, 12%, 14%, 16%, 18%, 20%, 22%, 24%, 26%, 28%, 30%}.
capacity level always increases in demand variability, the difference between  *
and   is larger as demand variability increases. Therefore, when correlation
is negative, profitability-loss higher as demand variability increases. When the
correlation is positive, higher production resource flexibility level relaxes the
pressure of under-investment, so that miss-specify a higher capacity level can be
less hurtful when demand variability increases.
To summarize, we discuss the conditions under which the profitability-loss is
significant. When the correlation between demand and production resource is
non-positively correlated, high demand variability leads to large profitability-loss;
When the correlation is positive, both too low and too high demand variability




Resource Disruption: Role of
Pre-shipment Financing
This chapter examines the role of pre-shipment finance in managing financial
production resource (working capital/budget) disruption. Hereafter, we use
‘budget’ to denote the financial production resource. Pre-shipment finance allows
the firm to transfer the purchase orders (which will be paid after production) to
an external party that provides immediate cash flow (at a cost) that can be used
for financing the production process. Pre-shipment financing creates necessary
liquidity for the firm when the budget is constraining. In comparing with basic
model, we name the model with pre-shipment finance as pre-shipment finance
model (abbreviated as PSF model). And we assume the partial equilibrium, which
means 1) the buyer(s) exogenously accepts any product quantity and its unit price
on the realized inverse demand curve; 2) the finance is risk free, as the firm would
always chooses a loan that can be fully secured within the product selling revenue.
Then, we characterize the optimal pre-shipment finance level (proportion of sales
revenues transferred) and the production volume in the production stage and the
optimal capacity investment level in the capacity stage. We make comparisons
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with the results in Chapter 3 to understand how pre-shipment financing alters the
effects of demand and production budget uncertainties on the optimal capacity
investment level, expected profit and profitability-loss due to ignoring budget
uncertainty. We identify that applying pre-shipment finance makes the capacity
investment and profits more resilient to changes in both demand and production
budget uncertainties. The profitability-loss by miss-choosing capacity level due
to ignore the constraint of production budget is significantly reduced compared
with that of basic model.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. We review the literature in
Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we introduce the formulation and assumptions of the
model and establish the optimal capacity investment policy and compare it with
the basic model. Then we derive analytical results for the sensitivity of optimal
capacity investment policy as well as the profitability in Section 4.3. Specifically,
we answer the research question: How would the optimal capacity level and
profitability be impacted by the demand and production resource variability and
the correlation between the two? Finally, in Section 4.4, we use analytical analysis
as well as complementary numerical study to answer second research question, if
the possibility of production resource shortage is ignored in capacity planning, as
often done in practice and the academic literature, would the resulting profitability
loss be significant and how do the demand and production resource uncertainties
affect this profitability loss?
4.1 Literature Review
Pre-shipment finance is a category of financing instruments issued when the
manufacturing firm wants payment (by its buyers directly or financial institutions)
of product selling revenue before the product shipment. In operationsmanagement,
the main objective behind is to release the financial distress of production process.
There are several types of pre-shipment finance including purchase order financing
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(Reindorp et al., 2018; Tang et al., 2018; Zhao and Huchzermeier, 2019), advance
payment discount (Boyacı and Özer, 2010; Zhao and Huchzermeier, 2019) and
buyer intermediated financing (Tunca and Zhu, 2018).
The only paper that consider capacity planning with pre-shipment finance is
Boyacı and Özer (2010), they investigate a capacity planning strategy that collects
commitments to purchase before the capacity decision and uses the acquired
advance sales information to decide on the capacity. In their model, a finite
number of price adjustments are made prior to the capacity decisions, the demand
uncertainty becomes endogenous and demand parameters get updated overtime
when applying the advance sell. Tang et al. (2018) address buyer direct financing
and purchase order financing without the buyer’s guarantee in a signalling game,
and focus on the effect of information asymmetry between buyer and bank on
the firm’s cost. Reindorp et al. (2018) study a two-stage supply chain where
a retailer buys from a supplier who faces financial constraints, also and the
retailer commits purchase order finance to supplier. They address the potential
of purchase commitments for mitigating capital market frictions. Zhao and
Huchzermeier (2019) investigate the interaction between firm’s operational and
financing choice between advance payment discount and buyer-backed purchase
order financing. Tunca and Zhu (2018) compare commercial loan and buyer
intermediated financing in the same supply chain and find that buyer intermediated
financing will improve channel profit.
4.2 Optimal Strategy ofPre-shipmentFinanceModel
The timeline of events for pre-shipment finance starts from (b̃, Ṽ) being resolved.
The firm is aware of the demand pattern of buyer, so does the selling revenue
providing any quantity of product (b − 1@?)@?. Then if necessary, together
with making production quantity decision @?, the firm finances (1 + A?)!?
amount against the product selling revenue to support production. Therein,
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only an advance value !? is used for relaxing production budget constraint,
a constant fraction A? ∈ [0, 1] is repaid to financial institution and spent as
transaction cost due to capital market friction. The pre-shipment financing
!? is decided almost at the same time as product quantity but a little later,
because pre-shipment financing amount is decided after product selling revenue
(b − 1@?)@? is settled with buyer. For the ease of exposition, we write down
the cash flow (in dollar) of the firm regarding to the model in chronological
order: at the beginning of the production stage C = 1, firm has production
budget worth V; and shortly after receiving pre-shipment finance the total amount
becomes (V + !?); then firm produces and ships the products so that leaves
(V + !? − H@?) on hand; finally, at the end of the production stage C = 2, firm
receives selling revenue minus the pre-shipment finance, therefore, end up has
(b − 1@?)@? − (1 + A?)!? + (V + !? − H@?) = (b − 1@?)@? − H@ − A?!? + V on
hand.
In practice, besides firm’s decisions mentioned above, there are inter-plays
among buyer(s), finance provider and the firm to get the deal done, for example,
buyer(s) commitment on purchase quantity and finance provider’s approval of
pre-shipment finance and interest rate (referring to Reindorp et al. (2018) for
endogenous buyer and exogenous finance provider problem; referring to Tang
et al. (2018) for the model having all three parties endogenized). We assume
away the supply chain effect and the bankruptcy risk management of the bank in
order to answer our core research question: how much does the financing release
the impact of production budget uncertainty on the capacity investment level
and the profitability. As the firm is in the profit maximizing scenario, we define
optimal profit the production stage as Π∗?
(
 , b, V
)
in which the firm decides
production quantity @∗ and pre-shipment finance principal !?. The expected
profit function in capacity investment stage is defined as Π? ( ). Noting that ‘?’
denotes pre-shipment finance. The pre-shipment finance model production stage
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formulation is as follows:
c∗?
(




(b − 1@)@ − H@ − A?!?






0 ≤ (1 + A?)!? ≤ (b − 1@)@.
The objective function quantifies the firm’s profit at the end of the time horizon.
The first constraint represents both capacity constraint: the production volume
cannot exceed the capacity level decided in the first stage; and financial (production
budget) constraint: the production cost is less than the financing available
which is released by pre-shipment financing. Therein, the pre-shipment finance
adds flexibility on the budget constraint. The second constraint represents
the financing limits that the firm should always be able to repay the loan. In
capacity investment stage, the profit maximizing objective function is denoted by
max
 ≥0








 , b̃, Ṽ
) ]}
, where the decision in concern is
the capacity investment level  in anticipation of the production stage optimal
profit. We presents the result in reverse chronological order since it is solved by
backward induction. Therein, Theorem 3 describes the unique optimal solution
to the production stage of PSF model and Theorem 4 provides unique optimal
capacity investment level. In order to present the optimal production stage
decisions, we define state space Ω?
8
8 = 3, 4, 5 as follows:
Ω
?
3 ( , A?) :=
(b, V) :
(




≤ V ≤ (b − H)H
21
,







4 ( , A?) :=
(b, V) :
(1 + A?)H < b < (1 + A?)H + 21 ,
V < V ≤ max
{
V,min







5 ( , A?) :=
(b, V) :
b ≥ (1 + A?)H + 21 ,





Theorem 3 (Optimal Production Stage Strategy of Pre-shipment Finance Model)
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Given the interest rate of financing A? ∈ (0, 1), the firm’s optimal production












(0, 0), if (b, V) ∈ Ω0( b−H
21 , 0
)
, if (b, V) ∈ Ω1( )













, if (b, V) ∈ Ω?4 ( , A?)(
 , H − V
)
, if (b, V) ∈ Ω?5 ( , A?)
The optimal sales profit in the product market Π∗? ( , b, V) is characterized by
c∗? ( , b, V) =

0, if (b, V) ∈ Ω0,
(b − H)2
41
, if (b, V) ∈ Ω1( ),
(b − H) − 1 2, if (b, V) ∈ Ω2( ),




, if (b, V) ∈ Ω?3 ( , A?),(
b − (1 + A?)H
)2
41
+ A?V, if (b, V) ∈ Ω?4 ( , A?),(
b − (1 + A?)H
)
 − 1 2 + A?V, if (b, V) ∈ Ω?5 ( , A?).
Recalling the optimal production quantity for basic model, the value takes
the minimal among internal optimal (b−H)
+
21 , capacity constraint  and production
budget constraint V/H. Now in Theorem 3, the only difference is that as production
quantity takes value V/H according to above comparison, it could be optimal
to use pre-shipment finance to weaken the negative effect of production budget
shortage.
Specifically, comparing with the optimal production strategy for basic model
in Theorem 1, this theorem indicates that, given same capacity level  , the
production budget tightening region Ω3 in basic model is replaced by union
of Ω?
8
8 = 3, 4, 5, where Ω?4 ∪ Ω
?
5 is the region with positive !
∗
? and optimal
production quantity are the same in region Ω3 and Ω?3 (see Figure 4.1 Panel
(a)). This indicates that the pre-shipment finance is only valuable when the
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Figure 4.1: State space (b, V) of optimal production strategy of pre-shipment
finance model.








(b) When  ≥ V
H
Note: from both Panel (a) and (b), state space becomes identical to resource-unconstrained
benchmark case when A? → 0; and Panel (a) becomes identical to the Basic model when
A? →∞.
production budget is realized low. And comparing with Ω?
8
8 = 3, 4, 5 themselves,
it shows that higher the demand realization more valuable the pre-shipment
financing. Figure 4.1 graphically represents how optimal production quantity and
pre-shipment principal are allocated in state space as stated in Theorem 3. In
the ideal case, higher the realization of demand, higher the optimal production
quantity @∗?, however, there are capacity constraint  and production budget
constraint V/H get in the way of increasing the production volume. As a result,
the intuition of applying pre-shipment finance is when demand is realized high
and production budget is realized low, as what in Ω?4 ( , A?) and Ω
?
5 ( , A?).
The intuitions behind production and finance decisions in terms of stage space
partition are as follows.
Ω
?
3 ( , A?) is the region having relatively larger market size versus relatively
not enough production budget, quantitatively V ≤ (b−H)H21 , and the production
decision is bounded by available budget at the beginning of production-stage.
What’s interesting is, even though on hand budget are not enough, it is optimal to
not apply pre-shipment finance. This plausible counter-intuitive phenomenon
happens because the cost of this financing is also identified as following statement:
using pre-shipment finance enhances unit production cost to (1 + A?)H, but firm
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gets A?V amount of compensation after production. According to this statement,
if carrying out pre-shipment finance, the optimal production quantity would
be b−(1+A?)H21 , in addition, under state space Ω
?





holds, current available budget are enough to produce b−(1+A?)H21 , it shows the




4 ( , A?), by definition, the optimal strategy is producing
b−(1+A?)H
21 amount
of products against on hand production budget plus requisite pre-shipment finance,






Also  > b−(1+A?)H21 indicates that the optimal quantity is attainable rather
than bounded by  . In Ω?5 ( , A?), the optimal strategy is in line with which
for Ω?4 ( , A?), except that as demand increases further, the internal optimal
production amount is not attainable because the production is bounded by
capacity  .
Adopting above optimal strategy in production stage, the corresponding first




















































b − (1 + A?)H
)
 − 1 2 + A?V
)
5 (b, V)3b3V.
Now we are in a position to characterize the firm’s optimal investment level for
PSF model.
Theorem 4 (Optimal Capacity Investment Level of PSF Model)
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The optimal capacity investment level  ∗? (l) is characterized as follows:








 * (l), if Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]






 ? (l), if 0 ≤ l < Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]
;

















The above characterization of optimal capacity investment level by unit capacity
cost is the same as the one for basic model. The only difference is that when
0 ≤ l < Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]
, the capacity level in PSF model should be larger
than the one in basic model because of the leverage of financing. Following
corollary shows the relation.
Corollary 3 Define l? := Ẽ
b
[
(b̃ − (1+ A?)H−21V/H)+
]
, the capacity investment
level of basic model and PSF model have following relation:
1. V
H
≥  ? (l) >   (l) >
V
H














>   (l), when 0 < l < l?.
Noting that  * is resource-unconstrained capacity level and   is resource-
constrained capacity level.
This corollary shows that with pre-shipment finance, both the optimal capacity
investment level and expected profit are higher than the case without the finance.
In addition, In second part of Corollary 3, when the unit capacity investment
level is very low, the firm optimally chooses a capacity level larger than the
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maximal possible level the production budget V can provide. The optimal capacity
investment level  ? doesn’t not depend on production budget uncertainty and is
only less than resource-unconstrained capacity level a value A?H21 . This value is
additional marginal production cost when applying pre-shipment finance.
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses for Pre-shipment Finance
Model - Comparison with Basic Model
In this section, we investigate the role of pre-shipment finance by preforming
sensitivity analysis in comparison with results in basic model. Similarly, we
establish optimal capacity investment based on bivariate normal distribution










(b̃ − (1 + A?)H)+ Pr
{
Ṽ ≤ 0
b̃}] , the optimal capacity
investment strategy is simplified as  ∗? (l) =

0, if l ≥ l?max;




immediate comparison with basic model is that the unit capacity cost threshold
l
?
max is larger than that of basic model lmax. The unit capacity cost threshold for
both models indicates that when unit capacity cost below this value the optimal
capacity investment level is positive. This shows that having the pre-shipment
finance, investing capacity is valuable in a wider range of capacity intensity. This
result fits the intuition that larger assume 0 < l < l?max in order to focus on the
analysis of  ? . To this end, we first start with the effect of correlation between
demand and production budget uncertainties on the capacity investment decision
and the profitability of the firm.
Proposition 9 (Impact of correlation d - PSF Model)
1. The optimal capacity investment  ? increases in d;
2. the corresponding optimal expected profit Π? ( ? ) increases in d.
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With a higher d, there will be a higher possibility for high demand associated
with high production budget, so that there will be a lower chance for the production
constrained by production budget. Therefore, same as the basic model case
in Proposition 1, both optimal capacity investment level and optimal profit are
increasing in the correlation.
4.3.1 Sensitivity to Demand Variability
In contrast to the correlation effect where both pre-shipment finance model
and basic model have same monotone sensitivity result, the effect of demand
variability is more complicate. Define a unit capacity cost threshold lb :=(
1−Φ




A?H, we briefly summarize the effect of demand variability.
When unit capacity cost is larger than lb , the effect of demand variability on
optimal capacity level and profit for pre-shipment model have the same pattern
as those for budget unconstrained benchmark model; otherwise, the effect of
demand variability on both optimal capacity level and profit for pre-shipment
model have same pattern as those for basic model.
We first introduce the effect on the optimal expected that is fully characterized.
Proposition 10 (Impact of fb on Π? ( ? ) - PSF Model)
1. When either d ≥ 0 or l > lb , Π? ( ? ) increases in fb;
2. When d < 0 and l ≤ lb , there exists a threshold f
Π?
b
(l, d) such that
Π? ( ? ) decreases in fb if fb < f
Π?
b
(l, d) and Π? ( ? ) increases in fb




As what shown in Proposition 10, when unit capacity cost is larger than lb ,
the optimal profit always increases in demand variability regardless of the value
of the correlation; when the unit capacity cost is no more than lb , the result
critically depends on the sign of the correlation, specifically, if the correlation is
non-negative the expected profit increases in demand variability; otherwise, there
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exists a demand variability threshold, below which a higher demand variability
decreases the profit and above which a higher demand variability increases the
profit.
As benchmark model indicates the first best result that the firm can get if there
is no production budget constraint, above result shows that a larger unit capacity
cost leads to production budget less affecting optimal profit in pre-shipment
finance model. The intuition is that, on the one hand, a higher unit capacity cost
is weaken the impact of production budget uncertainty. As we look back the state
space allocation in Figure 4.1 panel (a), the region production budget binding
the optimal decisions Ω?3 ( , A?) ∪ Ω
?
4 ( , A?) ∪ Ω
?
5 ( , A?) is shrinking due to
the decrease of  and a higher unit capacity cost decreases optimal capacity
investment level in general, it explains why the impact of production budget
uncertainty is weaken. On the other hand, with pre-shipment finance, the optimal
production quantity can be as high as capacity level when demand is high even if
the production budget is realized low. For this reason, the optimal expected profit
in pre-shipment model behaves similar to that in the benchmark model.
Then we move on to the effect of demand variability on optimal capacity
level in Proposition 11 and Conjecture 4, where the conjecture is supported by
partial analytical result and extensive numerical analysis with 54, 675 numerical
instances that will introduce in Section 4.4.1.
Proposition 11 (Impact of fb on  ? if d ≥ 0 - PSF Model) If d ≥ 0,  ?
increases in fb .
When the correlation between demand and production budget is non-negative,
the increasing trend of capacity investment level in demand variability. However,
when the correlation is negative pre-shipment finance reshapes the sensitivity
result.
Conjecture 4 (Impact of fb on  ? when d < 0 - PSF Model) When d < 0,
1. if l > lb ,  ? increases in fb;
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2. if l ≤ lb , there exists a threshold f
 ?
b








The conjecture is from partial analytical result we proved. Specifically, under









< 0 when l ≤ lb . In addition,
3 ?
3fb












From Conjecture 4 and Proposition 11, we can also find that when unit
capacity cost l is larger than threshold lb , the impact of demand variability on
optimal capacity level in PSF model has the same pattern as what in benchmark
model; whereas when the unit capacity cost is no larger than the threshold, the
impact of demand variability on capacity level in PSF model has the same pattern
as what in basic model. The reason is the same as the one for Proposition 10.
In summary, with pre-shipment finance, both optimal capacity investment
level and expected profit are closer to the first best case in benchmark model.
4.3.2 Sensitivity to Production Budget Variability
In this section, we investigate the impact of production budget variability on
both capacity investment level  ? and profitability Π? ( ? ). Firstly, we find that
the impact of production budget variability on capacity investment level doesn’t
change pattern in comparison with that for basic model.
































we have that it is not related with fV and l
 ?
V
















. The sensitivity result is characterized by
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,  ? increases in fV;

















(l)) = l where d ?
V
(l) increases in l. The sensitivity result is
(a) under condition d > d ?
V
(l),  ? increases in fV;
(b) under condition d = d ?
V
(l),  ? = `V/H which is not sensitive to
fV;
(c) under condition d < d ?
V
(l),  ? decreases in fV;







,  ? decreases in fV.
We find the exact same result structure as what in basic model (Proposition
5), that is larger l leads to optimal capacity investment level monotonically
increasing in production budget variability, low l leads to optimal capacity
monotonically decreasing in budget variability; when l is intermediate, the
sensitivity result critically depends on d, specifically, capacity level increases in
budget variability when d is high and decreases in budget variability when d is
low. What different between the result for pre-shipment finance model and basic
model is that they have different l threshold to separate the increasing trend and
the decreasing trend. The comparison between these l thresholds is provided in
following corollary.
Corollary 4 l ?
V
(d) > l 
V
(d).
Noting that l 
V
(d) is the unit capacity cost threshold for the effect of budget
variability on capacity level in basic model. This indicate that when pre-shipment
finance is applied, under a larger range of unit capacity cost, the optimal capacity
increasing in production budget variability. This suggests that the firm can invest
in capacity more aggressively when there are external financing options available.
Then we introduce the impact of fV on the optimal expected profit of the PSF
model, where it also has the same pattern as that of the basic model.
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(1 + A?)H + 21`V/H
) )+]
,
1. Under condition d ≤ 0 or l ≥ lΠ?
V
, we have Π? ( ? ) decreases in fV;
2. Under condition d > 0 and l < lΠ?
V
, there exists a unique fΠ?
V
(l, d) ∈
(0, dfb H21 ) such that Π? ( 









Proposition 13 shows that firm’s optimal expected profit first increases then
decreases in production budget variability only when unit capacity cost is low
and the correlation is high positive; otherwise, the profit monotonically decreases






(d) < l?max, ∀d ∈ (−1, 1).
Above corollary is in parallel to Corollary 2 presenting the comparison between
the unit capacity cost threshold l ?
V
(d) in Proposition 12 and lΠ?
V
in Proposition
13 given the correlation d. Recalling that in Proposition 12,  ? increases
in fV when unit capacity cost satisfies l < l
 ?
V
(d);  ? decreases in fV
otherwise; in Proposition 13, optimal profitΠ? ( ? ) first increases then decreases
in fV when unit capacity cost satisfies l < l
Π?
V
; Π? ( ? ) decreases in fV
otherwise. The intuition is that even though there is a wide range of (l, d) ∈{
(l, d) |l < l ?
V
(d), d ∈ (−1, 1)
}
under which a higher production budget
variability increases optimal capacity level, only a proper subset of above (l, d)
set, denoted by
{
(l, d) |l < lΠ?
V
, d ∈ (0, 1)
}
, is the range under which higher
production budget variability is profitable when production budget variability is
less than a certain threshold.
4.4 Profitability-loss
In the previous section, we have characterized the role of pre-shipment finance in
shaping the effects of demand and production budget uncertainties on capacity
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investment level and profitability. In this section, we further discuss the role of pre-
shipment finance in reducing profitability loss occurred when the firm mistakenly
chooses higher capacity investment level by ignoring uncertain production budget.
Also, we discuss the role of pre-shipment finance in how it shapes the impact of
the demand and production budget uncertainties on the profitability-loss.
We first introduce the function of profitability-loss. When the production
budget uncertainty is ignored, the firm believes that the problem faced by
himself is corresponding to the benchmark model, therefore, capacity level
is miss-chosen as  * , that is resource-unconstrained capacity level that the
firm would choose if there is no production budget constraint. In fact, the
pre-shipment model is corresponding to firm’s problem and the expected profit
is Π? (·) and the optimal capacity level should be  ? . Briefly speaking, the
firm would incur an optimality gap, since  * >  ? showed in Corollary 3. We
define the rate of the profitability-loss due to miss choosing capacity level as
ΔAΠ? :=
Π? ( ? )−Π? ( * )
Π? ( ? )
. As both resource-unconstrained capacity level  * and
 ? critically depend on unit capacity investment cost l and both capacity levels
















(b̃ − (1+ A?)H)+ Pr
{
Ṽ ≤ 0
b̃}] , we restrict
our analysis in this range of unit capacity cost.
In analyzing the sensitivity, we investigate the impact of the uncertainty
parameters (d, fb and fV) on the profitability-loss. We first present a proposition
showing how profitability-loss changes in the correlation between demand and
production budget uncertainties.
Proposition 14 (Impact of d on Profitability-loss - PSF Model) Profitability-loss
ΔAΠ? is decreasing in d.
In line with the effect of correlation on profitability-loss in basic model,
Proposition 14 demonstrates that a higher the correlation between demand and
production budget uncertainties results in a lower profitability-loss. The reason
is that,  * is not a function of the correlation. Base on this, we discussion the
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general insight. On the one hand, a higher correlation decreases the difference
between product quantity provided by realized production budget V
H
and the
internal optimal production quantity b−H21 , thus,  

? could be closer to  * as
the correlation increases. On the other hand, we have that mΠ? ( )
m 
increases
in d, meaning that as d increasing, the decreasing trend of Π? ( ) on  when
 >  ? (d) tends to be more flat. As a result, the rate of profitability-loss between
optimal expected profit and the profit without considering production-loss is
shrink when d increases.
4.4.1 Numerical Study Design
The numerical study is conducted relying on 54, 675 numerical instances with
wide range of parameter values extended around the baseline scenario. The only
difference of numerical study design from which for basic model is that we add
the pre-shipment finance interest rate where it takes value A? ∈ {6%, 12%, 18%}.
The value of financing rates are picked based on offers quoted by finance provider,
e.g. Paragon Financial Group charges interest rate ‘3% to 4% for the first 30 days;
1.25% every 10 days after that’ and payment terms that buyers can postpone the
payment date to the product manufacturing firm even after receiving the products,
where the duration of delay payment depends on negotiation result between trade
parties and the global or domestic trade regulation, ranging from 60 days to 180
days.
Recalling that the numerical design for the rest of parameters are: unit produc-
tion cost is standardized as 1 = 1, H = 1; mean value of demand uncertainty has





21 for each `b ; the demand variability fb ∈ [2%, 30%] is the percent-
age of `b with 2%-unit increments, and similarly, production budget variability
fV ∈ [2%, 30%] is also picked as the percentage of `V, varying with 2%-unit
increments; the correlation between demand and production budget uncertainties
takes value d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}; lastly,
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Table 4.1: Effect of demand variability fb on profitability loss ΔAΠ?.
fb
ΔAΠ? d
−0.995 −0.75 −0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.995
2%`b 0.009% 0.009% 0.009% 0.009% 0.009% 0.009% 0.009% 0.009% 0.009%
4%`b 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008%
6%`b 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008%
8%`b 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008% 0.008%
10%`b 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
12%`b 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
14%`b 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
16%`b 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
18%`b 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
20%`b 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
22%`b 0.007% 0.007% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
24%`b 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
26%`b 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
28%`b 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
30%`b 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
the unit capacity investment cost l ∈ {1, 5, 10}.
Similarly as the range of unit capacity cost in basic model picked,l takes value
{1, 5, 10} because l?max is an unit capacity cost threshold such that  ∗ =  ?
when l < l?max and  ∗ = 0 otherwise. Moreover, l
?
max is a function of
A?, 1, H, d, `b , fb , `V and fV such that l should be less than the lowest l?max for
all instances of {A?, 1, H, d, `b , fb , `V, fV}. Denoting l?max as the lowest value
mentioned above, we can safely pick l less than l?max = 12.9999.
4.4.2 Sensitivity to Demand Variability and Production Bud-
get Variability
In this section, we investigate the impact of demand variability fb and the impact
of production budget variability fV on the profitability loss. These impacts
depend on the correlation between demand and production budget uncertainties
and we conduct numerical analysis to uncover the effects.
Firstly, we discuss the impact of demand variability fb on the profitability-loss
ΔAΠ? × 100%. The numerical experiment is across all scenarios fixing fb/`b
and d and corresponding results are reported in Table 4.1.
From Table 4.1, we first observe that given fixed demand variability fb ,
profitability-loss is decreasing in correlation d, which verify the Proposition 7.
However, the decreasing trend is flat, which indicates that the firm is more resilient
to the correlation between uncertainties. Secondly, all entries are in the range of
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Table 4.2: Effect of production budget variability fV on profitability loss ΔAΠ?
fV
ΔAΠ? d
−0.995 −0.75 −0.5 −0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.995
2%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
4%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
6%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
8%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
10%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
12%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
14%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
16%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
18%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
20%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
22%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007%
24%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.007% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
26%`V 0.007% 0.007% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
28%`V 0.007% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
30%`V 0.007% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006% 0.006%
0.006%− 0.009% that is very small to be negligible. Noting that in Section 4.3.1,
we obtain that the pre-shipment finance model is ‘closer’ to the benchmark model
when unit capacity cost is larger than lb =
(
1 − Φ





lb < H and the values of l = 1, 5, 10 are greater than H, the numerical analysis
is in the high range that l  lb .
Next, we investigate the impact of fV on Profitability-loss in by performing
computational experiments. We numerically calculate the average profitability-
loss ΔAΠ? × 100% across all scenarios fixing fV/`V and d and report results in
Table 4.2.
In the above, we find that the profitability-loss entries also take very small
values either 0.006% or 0.007%, which also implies the resilience of the firm
in face of uncertainties when using pre-shipment finance. In addition, we
observe that a higher production budget variability decreases the profitability-
loss. Overall, we obtain that pre-shipment finance significantly reduces the
profitability-loss to a negligible value, because capacity investment level is low in
a high unit capacity investment cost scenario so that pre-shipment finance helps
firm dealing with production budget disruption events better in a way that the





Resource Disruption: Role of
Procurement Hedging Contract
When production resource is physical such as raw material or component,
pricing of material costs is directly linked to fluctuations in firm’s production
capability. Therefore, one of the way to manage the potential disruption of
production resource would be to lock in prices for a production resource at a
pre-determined fixed price through arriving at a fixed price procurement contract.
In managing production resource disruption in the capacity investment stage, we
apply procurement hedging contract, which is beneficial if it can allow the firm to
avoid unnecessary fluctuations of physical production resource, e.g. raw material
or component, in capacity investment spending. In this procurement hedging
contract, the firm alters the distribution of production resource to manage the risk
of production resource disruption.
We find that the partial hedging dominates full hedging and no-hedging
when demand and production resource is positively correlated and the unit
cost of investing capacity is low; no-hedging dominates when the positive
correlation between demand and production resource is high and the unit capacity
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investment cost is even lower. We identify that optimal partial hedging decreases
in both demand variability and the correlation, whereas it increases in production
resource variability. We show that the profitability increases in demand variability,
production resource variability and the correlation. Our numerical analysis shows
that the profitability loss due to ignoring production resource shortage possibility
in choosing capacity investment level is significant when demand variability is
large, production resource variability is large and the correlation is low. And the
profitability loss due to heuristically choosing always full hedging increases in
both demand and production resource variability.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. We review the literature in
Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we introduce the formulation and assumptions of
the model. In Section 5.3, we establish the optimal capacity investment policy
and compare it with the basic model. Then we derive analytical results for the
sensitivity of optimal capacity investment policy as well as the profitability in
Section 5.4. Specifically, we answer the research question: How would the
optimal capacity level, hedging strategy and profitability be impacted by the
demand and production resource variability and the correlation between the
two? Finally, in Section 5.5, we use extensive numerical study to answer second
research question: under what conditions, the profitability-loss is significant?
In analysing the profitability-loss, we not only consider the loss incurred due
to miss-specifying capacity level due to ignoring production resource shortage
possibility, but also study the profitability loss incurred because miss-specifying
the hedging decision as heuristically always fully hedging all resource uncertainty.
5.1 Literature Review
Our study is related to the literature on financial hedging in operations. In this
literature, researches study hedging contract decision of firm in conjunction with
operational investments in a variety of settings. In the seminal work of Froot et al.
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(1993), they point out that if capital market imperfections make external funds
more costly than internal funds, they can generate a rationale for risk management.
They show that when the investment opportunities and the availability of internal
funds are correlated, it may become optimal for a firm to utilize partial hedging.
Gaur and Seshadri (2005) study the optimal hedging for a risk-averse newsven-
dor with any given inventory level, based on the empirically proven assumption
that the newsvendor’s demand is correlated with the price of a financial asset.
They demonstrate the effectiveness of financial hedging when one can discover
tradable market assets partially correlated with market demand. Chod et al.
(2010) extend the work of Gaur and Seshadri (2005) by implicitly characterizing
the optimal multidimensional capacity investment and focusing on the comple-
mentarity/substitution effect between the operational (postponement and product)
flexibility and financial hedging. Ding et al. (2007) study the optimal policies
for capacity investment and hedging on currency exchange rates for a risk-averse
multinational newsvendor and find that the futures contract is the optimal hedge.
They establish the value of the joint use of the operational hedge (“allocation”
option) and the financial hedge, and understanding their effects on a risk-averse
firm’s capacity decisions and performance. Kouvelis et al. (2013) study how to
manage commodity risks (price and consumption volume) via physical inventory
and financial hedge in a multiperiod problem (with an interperiod utility function)
for a risk-averse firm procuring a storable commodity from a spot market at
a random price and a long-term supplier at a fixed price, where demand and
spot price of the commodity uncertainties are correlated. They contribute to
the literature and practice for managing storable commodity risks with tractable
optimal policies. Goel and Tanrisever (2017) study a firm that procures an input
commodity to produce an output commodity to sell to the end retailer. They
consider the stochastic dynamics of both input and output prices, and contribute
to the literature with the associated effect of their correlation on hedging decisions.
Turcic et al. (2015) explores the merits of hedging stochastic input costs (i.e.,
79
reducing the risk of adverse changes in costs) in a decentralized, risk-neutral
supply chain. They address the role that supply chains play in shaping corporate
financial policies. Kouvelis et al. (2019) study hedging cash-flow risks in a supply
chain where firms invest internal funds to improve production efficiencies. They
contribute to this literature by exploring how the vertical interactions of firms in
a supply chain affect their cash hedging strategies.
In our research, we consider hedging production resource uncertainty that is
correlated with demand. We study how capacity investment level and hedging
contract choice are affected by demand and production resource uncertainties.
5.2 Notations and Assumptions of Hedging Model
Consider a product manufacturing firm that faces a two-stage in capacity invest-
ment/product manufacturing decision. We extend the analysis with a optimal
hedging decision in first stage. In the first stage, the firm chooses capacity
investment level as well as the hedge ratio in anticipation of demand and raw
material or component supply (production resource) uncertainty. The hedging
decision is modelled as linear hedging strategy and the corresponding physical
resource becomes
ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ) Ṽ,
where ℎ ∈ [0, 1] is the ‘hedge ratio’ chosen by the firm. Specifically, the firm
locks in a value for a proportion of physical production resource at production
stage. Define that ℎ = 0 as no hedging, ℎ = 1 as full hedging and ℎ ∈ (0, 1)
as partial hedging. In the second stage, the demand of the end product and the
revised availability of physical resource are realized, and the firm chooses the
production quantity constrained by the minimum of capacity level and physical
resource.
Let Πℎ ( , ℎ) denote the expected profit of the firm at a capacity level  and
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hedge ratio ℎ ∈ [0, 1] in capacity investment stage and let c∗
ℎ
(
 , ℎ, b, V
)
denote
the firm’s the optimal profit at production stage given a capacity level  , hedge
ratio ℎ and realization of uncertainties, the formulation of the problem is as
follows. The capacity investment stage problem is
max
 ≥0,ℎ∈[0,1]
Πℎ ( , ℎ) = max
 ≥0,ℎ∈[0,1]
− l + E
(b,V)
[






 , ℎ, b, V
)









(b − 1@)@ − H@









For short, we name the formulation of the problem with procurement hedging
contract as Hedging Model.
5.3 Characterization of the Optimal Strategy for
Hedging Model
In this section, we characterize the firm’s optimal capacity investment, hedge
ratio and production decisions. The problem is solved using backward induction,
therefore, we first introduce optimal production decision given capacity  and
hedge ratio ℎ. We partition the state space (b, V) ∈
{
(b, V) : b > 0, V ∈ [V, V]
}
into four regions, Ω0 and Ωℎ8 , 8 = 1, 2, 3, each of which corresponds to different
optimal production quantity scenarios that we will show in Theorem 5. The
formal definitions of these regions are
Ωℎ1 ( , ℎ) :=
{
(b, V) : H < b < H + 21min




, V < V ≤ V
}
,
Ωℎ2 ( , ℎ) :=
{
(b, V) : b ≥ H + 21 ; max
{
V,min
{ H − ℎ`V
1 − ℎ , V
}}
< V ≤ V
}
,
Ωℎ3 ( , ℎ) :=
{
(b, V) : b ≥ H +
21
(
ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ)V
)
H
, V ≤ V < max
{
V,min
{ H − ℎ`V




and the complementary set of Ωℎ1 ( , ℎ) ∪ Ω
ℎ
2 ( , ℎ) ∪ Ω
ℎ
3 ( , ℎ) is Ω0, which
is the region of not investing in capacity in basic model. With the analysis
of production constraints, the optimal production strategy is characterized in
Theorem 5 and the expected profit Πℎ ( , ℎ) under optimal allocation is obtained.
In Theorem 6, the optimal resource capacity and hedge ratio is obtained from
Πℎ ( , ℎ) and characterized by unit capacity cost l.
Theorem 5 (Optimal Production Strategy of Hedging Model) Given capac-
ity  , hedge ratio ℎ and realizations of random variables (b̃ = b, Ṽ = V), the
optimal production level @∗
ℎ
( , ℎ, b, V) =

0, if (b, V) ∈ Ω0,
b − H
21
, if (b, V) ∈ Ωℎ1 ( , ℎ),
 , if (b, V) ∈ Ωℎ2 ( , ℎ),
ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ)V
H
, if (b, V) ∈ Ωℎ3 ( , ℎ),
and the corresponding optimal expected profit is
c∗
ℎ
( , ℎ, b, V) =

0, if (b, V) ∈ Ω0,
( b−H)2
41 , if (b, V) ∈ Ω
ℎ
1 ( , ℎ),








)2, if (b, V) ∈ Ωℎ3 ( , ℎ).
Figure 5.1 is corresponding to Figure 3.2 panel (b) in basic model, which
illustrates a case that production resource could be constraining and the hedge
ratio ℎ ∈ (0, 1). The reason is the given capacity level is in between of
minimal and maximal production quantity that supported by production resource
realization with revised distribution. Consequently, in a large demand realization
scenario when internal optimal production quantity is not attainable, Ωℎ2 ( , ℎ)
and Ωℎ3 ( , ℎ) indicate that either the capacity constraint is tighter or the resource
constraint is, respectively. Particularly, when (b, V) ∈ Ωℎ3 ( , ℎ), production
resource is tighter than capacity level such that the optimal production strategy
is to use up all production resource. In the case ℎ = 0, the optimal production
decision allocation falls back to the state space division for optimal production
decision in basic model. Finally, in the case ℎ = 1, production resource always
equals to it mean value `V, so the optimal production decision can be irrelevant
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Figure 5.1: State space of optimal production strategy of hedging model








and ℎ ∈ (0, 1)







, the graphical state space division of optimal production decision of
Hedging model is identical to Figure 3.2 panel (a). Also  > ℎ`V+(1−ℎ)V
H
is not feasible, because
the maximal amount of product using up physical production resource is ℎ`V+(1−ℎ)V
H
and it’s not
profitable to invest in capacity larger than this.
to capacity level if  ≥ `V/H or can fall back to the benchmark case when
 < `V/H.
We now proceed to characterize the optimal capacity investment level and
hedge ratio in capacity investment stage. The optimization problem in this stage
follows from Equation 5.1 by substituting E
(b,V)
[
c∗( , b̃, Ṽ)
]
by the characteri-
zation given by Theorem 1. To be specific, the expected profit as a function
of capacity level under optimal allocation is in following form: According to
Theorem 5, the expected profit in capacity investment stage when 0 ≤ ℎ < 1 is



































the expected profit when ℎ = 1 is
Πℎ ( , 1) = − l +

































where ΠD (·) is expected profit function of the resource unconstrained benchmark
model.
Then we obtain optimal capacity investment level and hedge ratio using above
equations. The optimal strategy is characterized by unit capacity cost and the
covariance between demand and production resource uncertainties.
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Theorem 6 shows that the optimal capacity investment and hedge ratio is




b̃ − H − 21`V
H
)+) .
Within two cases, the optimal strategy is critically decided by the value of unit
capacity cost l. In both cases, the firm should not invest in the project when the
unit capacity cost is too high; and when unit capacity is in a slightly low range, the
firm can optimally invest in a resource-unconstrained capacity investment level





















when unit capacity cost is in the range Ẽ
b,Ṽ
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b̃ − H − 21`V
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)+]
. As summarized above, the optimal strategy for both cases
are identical when l ≥ Ẽ
b,Ṽ
[
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. Whereas in case 2, partial hedge is optimal when unit capacity cost is
larger than max{0, lℎ} and no hedge is optimal when unit capacity is no more









Corollary 6 When l satisfies max{lℎ, 0} < l < Ẽ
b,Ṽ
[






we have   (l) ≤  
ℎ
(l). As resource constrained capacity level   (l) is the




H+21  (b − H − 21 
) 5 (b, V)3b3V, we have that
  (l) =  
ℎ
(l) when ℎ = 0.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we analyse the effect of demand variability, production resource
variability and the correlation between demand and production resource un-
certainties on optimal capacity investment level, optimal hedge ratio and the
corresponding optimal profit. In analysing these sensitivities, we make the same
distribution assumption on demand and production resource uncertainties, that









ª®®¬, where the correlation coefficient
d ∈ (−1, 1). Due to the property of normal distribution, the range of production
resource realization becomes (−∞,∞).
We firstly rewrite the optimal capacity investment and hedge strategy for
the case that demand and production resource uncertainties follows a bivariate
normal distribution.
Proposition 15 With bivariate normal distribution assumption, the covari-
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mal strategy with bivariate normal distribution assumption is characterized by
following two cases:
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2. when d > 0, we define lℎ as the unique solution of∫ H  (l)
−∞ (V − `V)Ẽ
b
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b̃ − H − 21V
H
)+V] 5V (V)3V = 0, where lℎ is positive
only when d > 21fV
Hfb
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Noting that the covariance thresholds is calculated as a function with the
sign decided by the value of correlation. Also, due to the range of production




b̃ − H − 21`V
H
)+]





does not take any value within a
range, since on the one hand, there is no minimal amount of production resource
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guaranteed for production process, on the other hand, a increases in hedge ratio
increases the marginal profit.
Proposition 15 shows that the full hedge is optimal when the correlation
between demand and production resource uncertainties is non-positive. It is
possible for partial hedge being optimal only when the correlation is positive
and the unit capacity cost is small enough. Beside the no capacity investment
case, no hedging is optimal only when correlation is high enough and the unit
capacity cost is even smaller and the optimal expected profit in this case equals to
the optimal profit in basic model, that is Πℎ (  (l), 0) = Πℎ (  (l)). Then, we
further discuss how does d shape the optimal expected profit.
Proposition 16 (Impact of d on Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) - Hedging Model) When d > 0
and
0 < l < Ẽ
b,Ṽ
[





, Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) strictly increases in d; other-
wise, Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) is not sensitive to d.
Proposition 16 indicates that when partial hedge or no hedge is optimal, the
profit increases in the correlation between demand and production resource
uncertainties. For the effect of d on optimal expected profit Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) the result
is in line with the the effect on optimal profit of basic model, intuitively, as the
correlation increases, high (low) demand is more likely to be matched by high
(low) production resource, and the production resource is less constraining for the
high demand to be met. On expectation, this higher correlation brings production
stage optimal structure closer to the resource-unconstrained case thus the higher
correlation is more beneficial for the firm.
For the sensitivity analysis for optimal capacity investment level and hedge
ratio. We’ve discussed how the resource unconstrained capacity level  * and
resource constrained capacity level   change in uncertainty parameters. Now
what remain unexplored are how optimal partial hedge ratio ℎ (l) and corre-
sponding optimal capacity investment level  
ℎ
(l) affected by the correlation,
demand variability and production resource variability. As their sensitivity results
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Figure 5.2: Effect of the correlation between demand and production resource
uncertainties d



















(a) Effect of d on ℎ∗
















(b) Effect of d on  ∗
ℎ

















(c) Effect of d on Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗)
Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fV = 16%`V , fb = 16%`b and d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}
cannot be obtained analytically, we run the extensive numerical analysis to show
the how do uncertainties parameters affect these optimal decisions. Starting from
the effect of the correlation d on ℎ (l) and  
ℎ
(l).




5.4.1 Sensitivity to Demand Variability
In this section, we investigate how demand variability fb affects the optimal
capacity investment level, optimal hedge ratio and corresponding expected profit.
In examine the demand variability, we make a comparison with the sensitivity
result of a basic model where the hedge strategy is not applied.
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Figure 5.3: Effect of demand variability fb on optimal profit Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗).

















(a) Effect of fb on Π∗ℎ when d = −0.5

















(b) Effect of fb on Π∗ℎ when d = 0.5
Note: Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fV = 16%`V and fb is the percentage of `b which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
Proposition 17 (Impact of fb on Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) - Hedging Model) Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) strictly





; otherwise,Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) is not sensitive
to fb .
We find that the optimal profit is always increases in demand variability as long
as the optimal capacity investment level is positive. Recalling that the optimal
profit in basic model is first decreasing then increasing in demand variability
when the correlation is negative, in comparison, we find that the negative effect
of the demand variability is vanished due to the optimal hedging. A graphic
representation of this proposition is shown in Figure 5.3.
In above figure, we find that a higher demand variability leads to ℎ (l)
decreases and  
ℎ
(l) increases. Similarly, the negative influence of higher
demand variability on capacity investment level is vanished because of the
optimal hedging.
5.4.2 Sensitivity to Production Resource Variability
In this section, we conduct sensitivity analyses to study how firms should
adjust their capacity investment level and hedge ratio as a response to changing
production resource variability. Also how production resource variability affects
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Figure 5.4: Effect of demand variability fb on optimal strategy ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗).



















(a) Effect of fb on ℎ∗ when d = −0.5














(b) Effect of fb on  ∗ℎ when d = −0.5



















(c) Effect of fb on ℎ∗ when d = 0.5
















(d) Effect of fb on  ∗ℎ when d = 0.5
Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fV = 16%`V and fb is the percentage of `b which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
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Figure 5.5: Effect of production resource variability fV on optimal strategy
Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗).

















(a) Effect of fV on Π∗ℎ when d = −0.5

















(b) Effect of fV on Π∗ℎ when d = 0.5
Note: Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fb = 16%`b and fV is the percentage of `V which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
the profitability of the firm is analysed. Proposition 18 shows expected profit
increases in production resource variability.
Proposition 18 (Impact of fV on Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) - Hedging Model) When d > 21fV
Hfb
and 0 < l < lℎ, Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) strictly increases in fV; otherwise, Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) is
not sensitive to fV.
We find that only when optimal hedge ratio is zero, the profit increases in
resource variability, otherwise, the profit doesn’t change in resource variability.
This reflects that the optimal partial hedge and corresponding capacity investment
level are chosen in a way that the optimal expected profit is not a function of
resource variability any more. A graphic representation of this proposition is
shown in Figure 5.5. Recalling the impact of resource variability on the optimal
profit stated in Proposition 6, the result also crucially depends on unit capacity
investment cost l and the correlation d. There exist threshold value of l and d
such that only when l less than its threshold and d larger than its threshold firm’s
optimal expected profit first increases then decreases in production resource
variability; otherwise, the profit monotonically decreases in production resource
variability. Different from the sensitivity result in basic model, in Proposition 18,
where increasing resource variability has negative influence on the optimal profit
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(a) Effect of fV on ℎ∗ when d = −0.5














(b) Effect of fV on  ∗ℎ when d = −0.5



















(c) Effect of fV on ℎ∗ when d = 0.5
















(d) Effect of fV on  ∗ℎ when d = 0.5
Note: Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fb = 16%`b and fV is the percentage of `V which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
in basic model, for hedging model, it is where the optimal profit is insensitive to
resource variability. Under condition that increasing resource variability is more
profitable in basic model, the optimal profit in hedging model is also increasing
in resource variability.
In above figure, we find that a higher production resource variability leads
to ℎ (l) increases and  
ℎ
(l) decreases. Recalling from the sensitivity result
for the effect of production resource variability in basic model. The capacity
investment level increases in resource variability only when the correlation is
high and the unit capacity cost is low; otherwise, the capacity level decreases in
resource variability. In this optimal partial hedge scenario, the increasing trend
of capacity investment in resource variability remains and the decreasing trend is
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removed because of hedge.
5.5 Profitability Loss
In this section, we address the third research question by extending our analyses
of the impact of the demand and production resource uncertainties on the
profitability-loss.
Previously, the profitability loss is incurred when the firm miss-specifying
the capacity because of ignoring the production resource. In this section, we also
discuss the significant of this loss in Section 5.5.1, specifically, this profitability
loss denoted by ΔAΠ1ℎ is defined as the percentage loss of profit due to ignoring
production resource when choosing optimal capacity investment level at the same
time the hedge ratio is always 0 as the resource is miss-regarded as infinite. The
mathematical formulation is as follows ΔAΠ1ℎ :=
Πℎ ( ∗ℎ ,ℎ
∗)−Πℎ ( * ,0)
Πℎ ( ∗ℎ ,ℎ∗)
. In addition,
miss-specifying hedge ratio can also lead to profitability loss, specifically, firm
heuristically chooses always fully hedging can cause profitability loss that is
denoted by ΔAΠ2ℎ :=




Πℎ ( ∗ℎ .ℎ∗)
.We will investigate the significance of
this profitability in Section 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Profitability Loss due toMiss-specifying Capacity Level
In this section, we study how the correlation between demand and production
resource, demand variability and production resource variability affect the value
of profitability-lossΔAΠ1ℎ :=
Πℎ ( ∗ℎ ,ℎ
∗)−Πℎ ( * ,0)
Πℎ ( ∗ℎ ,ℎ∗)
.
Starting from the impact of the correlation, following figure shows that the
profitability loss ΔAΠ1ℎ decreases in the correlation and the value of the loss.
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Figure 5.7: Effect of correlation d on profitability loss ΔAΠ1ℎ.














Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fV = 16%`V , fb = 16%`b and d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}
Then, we observe that the profitability-loss ΔAΠ1ℎ is increasing in demand
variability when the correlation is negative; the profitability-loss first decreases
then increases in demand variability when the correlation is positive. This
observation is consistent with the observation of profitability-loss for basic model.
Figure 5.8: Effect of demand variability fb on profitability loss ΔAΠ1ℎ.















(a) Effect of fb on ΔAΠ1ℎ when d = −0.5


















(b) Effect of fb on ΔAΠ1ℎ when d = 0.5
Note: Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fV = 16%`V and fb is the percentage of `b which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
Lastly, as for the impact of production resource variability, we observe that
the profitability-loss ΔAΠ1ℎ is increasing in the resource variability when the
correlation is negative; the profitability-loss first decreases then increases in the
resource variability when the correlation is positive. This observation is also
consistent with the observation of profitability-loss for basic model.
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(a) Effect of fV on ΔAΠ1ℎ when d = −0.5

















(b) Effect of fV on ΔAΠ1ℎ when d = 0.5
Note: Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fb = 16%`b and fV is the percentage of `V which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
In summary, we find that how profitability-loss ΔAΠ1ℎ change in uncertainty
parameters have the same pattern as the impact of these uncertainty parameters
on the basic model. On average, the loss is larger than the one in basic model.
5.5.2 Profitability Loss due to Miss-specifying Hedge Ratio
In this section, we study how the correlation between demand and production
resource, demand variability and production resource variability affect the value of
profitability-loss ΔAΠ2ℎ, which is the percentage Loss of profit due to heuristically
choosing always fully hedge, specifically,ΔAΠ2ℎ :=




Πℎ ( ∗ℎ ,ℎ∗)
.
As full hedging can be optimal strategy under certain condition and therefore
the profitability-loss ΔAΠ2ℎ = 0, the following corollary provides the condition,
under which this profitability is zero.
Corollary 7 Under condition d ≤ 0 or l ≥ Ẽ
b,Ṽ
[






have that ΔAΠ2ℎ = 0 .
Or equivalently, the profitability-loss is positive only when the correlation is
positive and the unit capacity cost is large enough.
Starting from the impact of correlation on the profitability-loss ΔAΠ2ℎ. The
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Figure 5.10: Effect of correlation d on profitability loss ΔAΠ2ℎ.



















Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fV = 16%`V , fb = 16%`b and d ∈ {−0.995,−0.75,−0.5,−0.25, 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.995}
Figure 5.11: Effect of demand variability fb on optimal strategy ΔAΠ2ℎ.



















(a) Effect of fb on ΔAΠ2ℎ when d = −0.5

















(b) Effect of fb on ΔAΠ2ℎ when d = 0.5
Note: Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fV = 16%`V and fb is the percentage of `b which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
profitability-loss increases in the correlation. When the unit capacity cost is
increasing the profitability-loss becomes smaller.
Then the impact of demand variability on the profitability-loss ΔAΠ2ℎ. We
also find that a higher demand variability leads to a larger profitability-loss.
Finally, we discuss the observations on the impact of the production resource





To summarize, the profitability-loss ΔAΠ2ℎ is positive when the correlation
is very high and the unit capacity cost is low. And when the profitability-loss
is positive, it increases when demand variability increases, production resource
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(a) Effect of fV on ΔAΠ1ℎ when d = −0.5















(b) Effect of fV on ΔAΠ2ℎ when d = 0.5
Note: Figures are depicted using baseline scenario 1 = 1, H = 1, `b = 16H, `V = (`b − H)H/4,
fb = 16%`b and fV is the percentage of `V which are {4%, 8%, 12%, 16%, 20%, 24%, 28%}.
variability increases and the correlation between the two increases. Note that
a high positive correlation means that higher demand is more likely to occur
together with high resource availability, at the same time, a low unit capacity cost
translates to a higher capacity investment level, as a result, the internal optimal
production quantity as well as high second stage profit is more possible to attain
as both resource constraint and capacity constraint are large. As uncertainty in




We have studied the stochastic capacity investment problem of how a firm should
anticipate the capacity investment level change in demand and production resource
uncertainties, where the production resource can either be financial, e.g. working
capital / budget, or be physical, e.g. raw material / components. And through
analytical and computational study, we show how significant this jointly influence
of uncertainties make the firm loss when the firm simply ignores the production
resource. Also we investigate two management strategies to counteract against
financial production resource shortage and physical resource shortage respectively,
that are pre-shipment finance and procurement hedging strategy.
More specifically, first of all, we obtain the optimal capacity investment
strategy under these uncertainties and show that the unit capacity cost critically
characterizes the optimal strategy. We perform a whole set of analytical sensitivity
analyses to answer how production resource uncertainty, demand uncertainty
and their correlation shape the optimal capacity and profitability. We find that
demand variability is not always favourable as traditional literature suggests.
The sensitivity results with respect to production resource variability is more
complex, unit capacity cost and the correlation crucially determine the result.
This suggests managers that the capacity intensity together with how the product
demand correlates with the economic condition shape the impact of production
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resource volatility. Then, for the first time in the literature, our study provides
insights on how the correlation between the production resource and demand may
reshape the optimal capacity investment decision as well as the expected profit.
Thirdly, via computational study, we find that high volatility of both demand and
production resource results in high profitability-loss; and lower the correlation,
higher the profitability-loss.
We then extend the model with a pre-shipment finance facility to alleviate the
potential budget shortage in production stage. We also perform a whole set of
analytical sensitivity analyses to answer how production resource uncertainty,
demand uncertainty and their correlation shape the optimal capacity and prof-
itability. And find that when the interest rate of the pre-shipment finance is lower
than a threshold, then higher demand variability is beneficial that is different from
the sensitivity result in basic model. In analyzing profitability-loss, we find that
the loss is negligibly small, suggesting that as long as there is a last minute finance
available for alleviate the budget constraint, the capacity investment decision can
be made without considering the possibility of budget short.
Finally, we extend the model with procurement hedging contract to control
the uncertainty of physical resource uncertainty in the capacity investment stage.
We find that partial hedging can be optimal if the correlation between and
production resource uncertainties is high and the unit capacity investment cost is
very low. The sensitivity analyses show that a increasing in production resource
uncertainty, demand uncertainty and their correlation all lead to the increasing in
the profitability. We find that the always full hedging heuristic strategy leads to
very small profitability-loss.
Our model framework also captures an assemble-to-order system where the
each unit of final product requires one unit of component 1 (which is represented
by capacity investment level in our basic model) and one unit of component 2
(which is represented by the additional production resource—which is either
budget or physical resource). The decision variable of the model is optimizes
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component 1 order quantity under the uncertainty in component 2 volume. This
component 2 can also be regarded as the assembly capacity that limits the volume
of assembling end product. We offer a few future research directions for this
framework. One can extend this framework by also considering optimizing
component 2 order quantity and subject to yield uncertainty (hence production
uncertainty).
One limitation of our study is that it examines one type of production resource
and manages different type of the resource separately. In reality, financial
and physical resources well as other dimensions of constraints affect the firm’s
production process so as to the capacity investment decision. To assess the
impact of both pre-shipment finance and procurement hedging contract as well as
other dimensions of constraints, a simulation study fitting the firm’s operational
structure is likely to be required.
The model and analysis in this study can potentially provide a foundation
and rule of thumb for future research to see the resemblance between the area of
operations-OM and physical supplementary resource reliability management.
101
Bibliography
Alan, Y., & Gaur, V. (2018). Operational investment and capital structure under
asset-based lending.Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 20(4),
637–654.
Babich, V. (2010). Independence of capacity ordering and financial subsidies
to risky suppliers.Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 12(4),
583–607.
Babich, V., & Sobel, M. J. (2004). Pre-ipo operational and financial decisions.
Management Science, 50(7), 935–948.
Birge, J. R. (2015). Om forum—operations and finance interactions. Manufactur-
ing & Service Operations Management, 17(1), 4–15.
Bounds, A. (2018). Uk small businesses face average £9,000 bill to recover late
payments. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/1a2d21e6-fc7e-11e8-
ac00-57a2a826423e
Boyabatlı, O., Leng, T., & Toktay, L. B. (2016). The impact of budget constraints
on flexible vs. dedicated technology choice. Management Science, 62(1), 225–
244.
Boyabatlı, O., Nasiry, J., & Zhou, Y. (2019). Crop planning in sustainable
agriculture: Dynamic farmland allocation in the presence of crop rotation
benefits. Management Science, 65(5), 2060–2076.
Boyabatlı, O., & Toktay, L. B. (2011). Stochastic capacity investment and flexible
vs. dedicated technology choice in imperfect capital markets. Management
Science, 57(12), 2163–2179.
102
Boyacı, T., & Özer, Ö. (2010). Information acquisition for capacity planning
via pricing and advance selling: When to stop and act? Operations Research,
58(5), 1328–1349.
Caldentey, R., & Haugh, M. B. (2009). Supply contracts with financial hedging.
Operations Research, 57(1), 47–65.
Chen, L., Li, S., & Wang, L. (2014). Capacity planning with financial and opera-
tional hedging in low-cost countries. Production & Operations Management,
23(9), 1495–1510.
Chod, J., & Rudi, N. (2005). Resource flexibility with responsive pricing. Opera-
tions Research, 53(3), 532–548.
Chod, J., Rudi, N., & Van Mieghem, J. A. (2010). Operational flexibility and
financial hedging: Complements or substitutes?Management Science, 56(6),
1030–1045.
Chod, J., &Zhou, J. (2014). Resource flexibility and capital structure.Management
Science, 60(3), 708–729.
Ciarallo, F. W., Akella, R., & Morton, T. E. (1994). A periodic review, production
planning model with uncertain capacity and uncertain demand—optimality of
extended myopic policies. Management Science, 40(3), 320–332.
Dada,M.,&Hu,Q. (2008). Financing newsvendor inventory.Operations Research
Letters, 36(5), 569–573.
Dempsey, H., & Parkin, B. (2019). Diamond miners dented by liquidity crisis
among india’s polishers. Financial Times. https : / /www.ft . com/content /
d1165958-1529-11ea-9ee4-11f260415385
de Véricourt, F., & Gromb, D. (2019). Financing capacity with stealing and
shirking. Management Science, 65(11), 5128–5141.
Ding, Q., Dong, L., & Kouvelis, P. (2007). On the integration of production and
financial hedging decisions in global markets. Operations Research, 55(3),
470–489.
103
Feng, Q. (2010). Integrating dynamic pricing and replenishment decisions under
supply capacity uncertainty. Management Science, 56(12), 2154–2172.
Feng, Q., & Shi, R. (2012). Sourcing from multiple suppliers for price-dependent
demands. Production and Operations Management, 21(3), 547–563.
Findlay, S., Kuchler, H., & Neville, S. (2020). Drugmakers braced for coronavirus
disruption to china supplies. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/
8630c51c-4cc0-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1993). Risk management:
Coordinating corporate investment and financing policies. the Journal of
Finance, 48(5), 1629–1658.
Gaur, V., & Seshadri, S. (2005). Hedging inventory risk through market in-
struments. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 7(2), 103–
120.
Goel, A., & Tanrisever, F. (2017). Financial hedging and optimal procurement
policies under correlated price and demand. Production and Operations
Management, 26(10), 1924–1945.
Goldratt, E. M. (1990). Theory of constraints. North River Croton-on-Hudson.
Haren, P., & Simchi-Levi, D. (2020). How coronavirus could impact the global
supply chain by mid-march. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2020/
02/how-coronavirus-could-impact-the-global-supply-chain-by-mid-march
Henig, M., & Gerchak, Y. (1990). The structure of periodic review policies in the
presence of random yield. Operations Research, 38(4), 634–643.
Hu, X., Duenyas, I., & Kapuscinski, R. (2008). Optimal joint inventory and
transshipment control under uncertain capacity. Operations Research, 56(4),
881–897.
Iancu, D. A., Trichakis, N., & Tsoukalas, G. (2017). Is operating flexibility
harmful under debt? Management Science, 63(6), 1730–1761.
Khang, D. B., & Fujiwara, O. (2000). Optimality of myopic ordering policies for
inventory model with stochastic supply. Operations Research, 48(1), 181–184.
104
Kouvelis, P., Li, R., & Ding, Q. (2013). Managing storable commodity risks: The
role of inventory and financial hedge.Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 15(3), 507–521.
Kouvelis, P., Wu, X., & Xiao, Y. (2019). Cash hedging in a supply chain.
Management Science, 65(8), 3928–3947.
Lee, H. L., & Billington, C. (1993). Material management in decentralized supply
chains. Operations Research, 41(5), 835–847.
Natarajan, K. V., & Swaminathan, J. M. (2014). Inventory management in
humanitarian operations: Impact of amount, schedule, and uncertainty in
funding. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 16(4), 595–603.
Ning, J., & Sobel, M. J. (2018). Production and capacity management with
internal financing. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 20(1),
147–160.
Reindorp, M., Tanrisever, F., & Lange, A. (2018). Purchase order financing:
Credit, commitment, and supply chain consequences. Operations Research,
66(5), 1287–1303.
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms’ hedging policies.
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 20(4), 391–405.
Stein, C. (1972). A bound for the error in the normal approximation to the
distribution of a sum of dependent random variables. In Proceedings of the
sixth berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability, volume
2: Probability theory.
Stoll, J. D. (2014). National electric vehicle halts saab production. The Wall Street
Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/national-electric-vehicle-halts-saab-
production-1400589677
Swinney, R., Cachon, G. P., & Netessine, S. (2011). Capacity investment timing
by start-ups and established firms in new markets.Management Science, 57(4),
763–777.
105
Tan, B., Feng, Q., & Chen, W. (2016). Dual sourcing under random supply capac-
ities: The role of the slow supplier. Production and Operations Management,
25(7), 1232–1244.
Tang, C. S., Yang, S. A., & Wu, J. (2018). Sourcing from suppliers with finan-
cial constraints and performance risk.Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 20(1), 70–84.
Tanrisever, F., Joglekar, N., Erzurumlu, S., & Lévesque, M. (2019). Managing
capital market frictions via cost-reduction investments. Manufacturing &
Service Operations Management.
Tanrısever, F., Erzurumlu, S. S., & Joglekar, N. (2012). Production, process
investment, and the survival of debt-financed startup firms. Production &
Operations Management, 21(4), 637–652.
Tunca, T. I., & Zhu, W. (2018). Buyer intermediation in supplier finance.Man-
agement Science, 64(12), 5631–5650.
Turcic, D., Kouvelis, P.,&Bolandifar, E. (2015).Hedging commodity procurement
in a bilateral supply chain. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
17(2), 221–235.
Van Mieghem, J. A. (2003). Commissioned paper: Capacity management, in-
vestment, and hedging: Review and recent developments. Manufacturing &
Service Operations Management, 5(4), 269–302.
Van Mieghem, J. A., & Dada, M. (1999). Price versus production postponement:
Capacity and competition. Management Science, 45(12), 1639–1649.
Wang, Y., Gilland, W., & Tomlin, B. (2010). Mitigating supply risk: Dual sourcing
or process improvement?Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
12(3), 489–510.
Wang, Y., & Gerchak, Y. (1996). Periodic review production models with variable
capacity, random yield, and uncertain demand.Management Science, 42(1),
130–137.
106
White, E., Jung-a, S., Miller, J., & Campbell, P. (2020). Eu and us carmakers
warn ‘weeks away’ from china parts shortage. Financial Times. https://www.ft.
com/content/48bae4c0-472e-11ea-aeb3-955839e06441
Xu, X., & Birge, J. R. (2004). Joint production and financing decisions: Modeling
and analysis. Available at SSRN 652562.
Yang, J. (2004). Production control in the face of storable raw material, random
supply, and an outside market. Operations Research, 52(2), 293–311.
Yang, J., Qi, X., & Xia, Y. (2005). A production-inventory system with markovian
capacity and outsourcing option. Operations Research, 53(2), 328–349.
Zhao, L., & Huchzermeier, A. (2019). Managing supplier financial distress with




For ease of reading, we list the notations used through the paper in Table A.1.
Table A.1: Summary of Notations




l unit capacity investment cost
H unit production cost
1 price sensitivity to quantity
`b , fb expected value and standard deviation of marginal demand
[V, V] support of production resource
`V, fV expected value and standard deviation of marginal production resource
d correlation coefficient between b̃ and Ṽ
A? interest rate of pre-shipment finance
Optimal Decisions
@ production quantity
 * resource-unconstrained capacity level
  resource-constrained capacity level
!? pre-shipment finance loan
ℎ the hedge ratio
Profit Functions
c Optimal production stage profit
Π Expected profit under resource constrained case (basic model)
ΠD Expected profit under resource unconstrained case
Π? Expected profit for Pre-shipment finance model
Πℎ Expected profit for Hedging model
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A.1 Proofs for the Optimal Strategy and sensitivity
analyses of Basic Model
A.1.1 Proofs for the Optimal Strategy
Theorem 1 and 2 present the optimal strategy of basic model in production stage
and capacity investment stage respectively. We provide the proofs of these two
theorems in this section. Then we illustrate the proof of Lemma 2 that compare
the capacity investment level and profitability between benchmark model and this
basic model.
Proof of Theorem 1:
The problem is solved by KKT condition. Note that (b − 1@)@ − H@ is concave
with first order derivative equals zero at @ = b−H21 . If
b−H
21 ≤ 0, then @
∗ = 0;






















Proof of Theorem 2:
The optimal capacity investment level for basic model is derived from the
expected profit in capacity investment stageΠ( ), namely Equation (3.2). Taking
































Note that mΠ( )
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5 (b, V)3b3V − H
∫ ∞
H+21 













The immediate result from above equation is that Π( ) is concave in  since
m2Π( )
m 2
≤ 0. Therefore, the optimal  ∗ satisfies that  ∗ = 0 if mΠ( )
m 
| =0 ≤ 0,




;  ∗ satisfies −l +
∫ ∞
H+21 ∗ (b − H− 21 
∗) 5b (b)3b = 0, if
mΠ( )
m 
| =0 ≥ 0 and mΠ( )m | =V/H ≤ 0. That is, E
[ (
b̃−H−21V/H
)+] ≤ l < E[(b̃−
H)+
]




H+21 ∗ (b−H−21 
∗) 5 (b, V)3b3V = 0
if l < E
[ (
b̃ − H − 21V/H
)+] .
A.1.2 Proofs for the sensitivity analyses
In this appendix section, we provide the proofs of sensitivity results for basic
model. For tractability, some preliminaries are introduced before all proofs. We
define several standardized normal distributions to differentiate the transformation































b̃ respectively, therein, the conditional distributions are





( Ṽ − `V), f2b (1 − d2)
)





(b̃ − `b), f2V (1 − d2)
)
. The expected profit in the capac-
ity investment stage Π( ), i.e. Equation (3.2), will be widely used in the proofs
of sensitivity results, for the ease of calculation, we transform it in standard
normal distribution form, that is
Π( ) = −l +
4∑
8=1
+8 ( ), (A.1)
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AsΠ( ) is the continuous function, the derivatives at the boundaries are cancelled





















We introduce the Stein’s Lemma which helps simplifying the proof.
Lemma 3 (Stein, 1972)
1. Suppose Ĩ is a normally distributed random variable with expectation 0 and










both exist (the existence of the expectation of any











2. Suppose -̃ is a normally distributed random variable with expectation











both exist (the existence of
the expectation of any random variable is equivalent to the finite of the
expectation of its absolute value). Then
E
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First of all, we prove the impact of correlation between demand and production
resource uncertainties, the result of which is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1:
In this proof, we demonstrate that both   and Π( ) increase in d. Starting











is derived by implicit
differentiation, m2Π
m md

































> 0 for all K. As a result,   increases in d is proved.
Subsequently, we provide the proof for the impact of d on Π( ). According
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(b̃ − `b), f2V (1 − d2)
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and
@∗( , b, V) is piecewise differentiable and continuous, E
V |b
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[m@∗( , b, Ṽ)
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5 (b, V)3b3V > 0.
Proofs for the fb Results
Proof of Proposition 2:
We will investigate the impact of fb on  * and ΠD ( *). ΠD and mΠD ( )m 
are transformed into expectations with standard normal distribution as follows,
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(I1fb + `b − H) − 1 2
)
q(I1)3I1






(I1fb + `b − H−21 )q(I1)3I1. Following analyses
are using above two expressions:





























We therefore obtain 3 *
3fb
> 0, which implies  * increases in fb .
2. We investigate the impact of fb on expected profit ΠD ( ) ∀ ∈ (0,∞)

















q(I1)3I1 > 0 ∀ > 0,
therefore, ΠD ( *) also increases in fb .
Now, we provide the proof of the impact of fb on   and Π( ).
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Proof of Proposition 3:



















have same sign. The proof
is divided by cases in terms of d, that is d ∈ [0, 1), d → −1 and d ∈ (0, 1).















1 − d2 + dI0
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q(I2)3I2q(I0)3I0, (A.3)
then we use the normal distribution probability density function structure and































> 0 for all  if d ≥ 0.
Then, we discuss how   changes in fb when d → −1. The goal of this
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< 0 if and only if fb satisfies that`b − H − 21 limd→−1 fb
 >  H limd→−1  − `VfV
. (A.5)
That is to say, we turn Inequality (A.5) into the inequality with respect to fb
explicitly, then the sensitivity result is proved. Note that lim
d→−1
  is a function of
fb , to prove the result there are two steps: 1) rewrite the Inequality (A.5) as the
inequality of lim
d→−1
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− `V, there are sub-cases since





and (`b−H)fV/fb−`V21fV/fb−H is worth discussed. Particularly,
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We now generate the range of fb based on above inequality of lim
d→−1
 
using the information that lim
d→−1
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(21`V − (`b − H)H
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Now, we derive the range of fb through the range of lim
d→−1
 :
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in fb , we conclude that there exists a unique fb defined as f88b =fb
fb > 21fVH , limd→−1 mΠ( )m  = (`b −H)fV/fb −`V21fV/fb −H = 0
 such thatfb ∈ [f888b , f88b ]∩
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decreases in both  and fb , we conclude that










































 > 0 and limd→−1 mΠ( )m decreases





fb < 21fVH , limd→−1 mΠ( )m  = (`b −H)fV/fb −`V21fV/fb −H = 0
 such that fb <
min{f8
b







Therefore, applying some algebra we conclude that when d → −1,





  decreases infb whenfb < max{f88b , 21fV/H};
it increases in fb otherwise;





  decreases infb whenfb < min{f8b , 21fV/H};
it increases in fb otherwise.
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Now we demonstrate some characteristics of   when d < 0 to theoretically
support Conjecture 1.
















1.   < `b−H21 when fb < fb;  
 =
`b−H




when fb > fb;





< 0 when d < 0.
Proof of Lemma 4:



















































= 0 when fb = fb . Therefore, we proved the
first part:   > `b−H21 when fb > fb and  
 ≤ `b−H21 when fb ≤ fb , because
mΠ( )
m 
is decreasing in  .











































> 0 for all  > `b−H21 , or equivalently,  
 increases in fb
when fb ≥ fb .
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< 0 for all  < `b−H21 when d < 0, using













































< 0 for all  < `b−H21 including limfb→0
 .
Proof of Proposition 4:
The impact of fb on Π( ) is proved using The Envelope Theorem, the













from Equation (A.1), because the derivative of the integral boundaries are
























































































































Therein, @∗( Ĩ2, Ĩ0) one to one corresponds to the optimal production quantity











































































From above equation, the immediate result is that mΠ( )
mfb
> 0 for all  when
d ≥ 0.
Then we proof the impact of fb on Π( ) under condition d < 0 through






























> 0 ∀ ∈ (0,∞).
















































































































































































































< 0 for all  > 0.












































































































































is positive for all  ∈ (0,∞).
Proofs for the fV Results
Proof of Proposition 5:













. We calculate m
2Π( )
m mfV
by taking derivative of Equation (A.2)
with respect to fV. The calculation is according to Leibniz’ formula and due to






















The immediate conclusion from above equation is that m
2Π( )
m mfV
< 0 when H < `V;
m2Π( )
m mfV
= 0 when H = `V; and m
2Π( )
m mfV
> 0 when H > `V. Since these
conditions depend on  , we then apply the optimality condition such that  is
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substituted with  for these conditions. The necessary and sufficient condition of
  < `V/H,   = `V/H and   > `V/H are mΠ( )m 

`V/H
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< 0, if l > l V (d)








> 0, if l < l V (d).
(A.9)
Since d ∈ (−1, 1), we identify the range of l 
V
(d) according to the domain.
We obtain that l 
V
(d) increases in d from m
2Π( )
m md
> 0 for all  (result in part




= −l + l 
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(d) also increases in
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such that we identify the range of l 
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(d) is l 
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(1)), specifically the threshold
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denoted by d 
V






















Recalling the conditions wrote in Equation (A.9), we conclude the sensitivity
result for all l ∈ (0, lmax)




< 0 for any d.




> 0 for any d.









under condition d = d 
V
(l),   = `V/H which is not sensitive to fV; and






Proof of Proposition 6:
The impact of fV on Π( ) is derived according to the Envelope Theorem,
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Under condition l ≥ l 
V
(d), we prove that Π( ) decreases in fV. Ob-
serving from Equation (A.10), mΠ( )
mfV
< 0 when H ≤ `V, because the integrand
is non-positive for all I0 ∈
(
− ∞, (H − `V)/fV
]
. Recalling from the proof of





= −l + l 
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(d) ≤ 0, we conclude that under condition l ≥ l 
V
(d),
Π( ) decreases in fV.
Under condition l < l 
V
(d), we derive the result on how Π( ) changes
in fV step by step. Noting that l < l V (d) is equivalent to H  (l) > `V,
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a result, 3 
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, what we need to uncover is the
impact offV ∈ (0,
dHfb
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( H + 21 (I0fV+`V)
H

















( H + 21 (I0fV+`V)
H






Since 6(I0) > 0 increases in I0 when fV ∈ (0,
dfb H



































> 0 when fV ∈ (0,
dfb H







3. When l is in between of 0 and l 
V











for any fixedfV. Firstly, we know that mΠ( )mfV increases in  
when  > `V/H, for details referring to the proof of Proposition 5. We also







for all fixed fV,   decreases in l by optimality condition for solving  .
Lastly, we also know that mΠ( )
mfV












for any fixed fV.
Having all above information, we can conclude that given d > 0, as l increases
from 0 to l 
V















< 0 for all fV; and when l < lΠV (d), there exists a fV
threshold fΠ
V










< 0 when fV > fΠV (l, d). In addition, fΠV (l, d) is decreasing
in l.
We further investigate the characteristic of lΠ
V
(d) given domain d ∈ (0, 1).
First of all, lΠ
V









= 0 given d > 0; secondly, lΠ
V
(0) = 0; thirdly, lΠ
V
(d) in-




















in d is proved















































































ª®®¬ q(I0)3I0 > 0.
























, there exists a unique d denoted by dΠ
V









= 0. The result can be written as what in the proposition.
A.1.3 Sensitivity Analyses on Profitability-loss
Proof of Lemma 2:
Under condition 0 < l < E
[ (
b̃−H−21V/H
)+] , we first prove  (l) <  * (l).
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According to definition of  * (l), we have  * (l) > V/H and thus  * (l) can























(b − H − 21 *) 5b |V (b)3b 5V (V)3V < 0.
Since we know that mΠ( )
m 




= 0,   (l) <  * (l)
is proved.





































Therefore, we have inequality Π( ) < ΠD ( ) < ΠD ( *).
Proof of Proposition 7:
In this proof, we demonstrate Profitability-loss is decreasing in d. Given




Π( ) , we will prove how ΔΠ
changes in d, which is equivalent to derive the sign of 3ΔΠ(d)
3d
. Due to only Π( )












































We can conclude 3ΔΠ(d)
3d
< 0 by the following reason: firstly, from Proposition
1, we have mΠ( )
md










because  * >  ; secondly, according to the optimality











< 0 when  ≤ `V/H;
2. when d ≤ 0, mΠ( )
mfV
< 0 for all fV ≥ 0;
3. when d > 0,






(b) if fV <
dHfb





= 0, such that mΠ( )
mfV















Proof of Lemma 5:


















(1 − d2) + `b + dfbI0 − H − 21



























> 0, therefore, it is easy to
see that when  ≤ `V/H, we have that mΠ( )mfV < 0 for all fV ≥ 0.
Proof of part 2: Further organizing mΠ
 ( )
mfV
































( H + 21(I0fV+`V)
H







we conclude another result: when d ≤ 0, mΠ( )
mfV
< 0 for all fV ≥ 0.
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Proof of part 3: When d > 0, we can conclude from Equation (A.11) that
mΠ( )
mfV
























we know that mΠ( )
mfV
decreases in  when  ≤ `V/H and increases in  when
 > `V/H. According to mΠ( )mfV < 0 for all  ≤ `V/H, we obtain that given a fixed
fV <
dHfb








< 0 when  <  0(fV) and mΠ( )mfV > 0 when  >  0(fV). We calculate















































(1 − d2) + `b + dfb
( H − `V
fV
)

















which concludes that m 
0 (fV)
mfV
> 0. Since  0 is increasing in fV, we have
that mΠ( )
mfV















where  −10 (·) is the inverse function of  0(fV), we define
this inverse function as fV0(·).
Proof of Proposition 8:
In this proof, we partially characteristic the impact of fV on Profitability-loss.




Π( ) , we will prove how ΔΠ
changes in fV, which is equivalent to derive the sign of 3ΔΠ3fV . Due to only Π( )
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Proof of part 1: In this part, we will demonstrate following result: when
l ≥ l* , 3ΔΠ3fV > 0 for all fV - the case where  














, in this case, we
have l > l 
V
which indicates   < `V/H and mΠ( )mfV

  (fV)
< 0. As for l ≥ l*









(I1fb + `b − H − 21`V/H)q(I1)3I1
= − l + fbE
[(
Ĩ1 −








< 0. Also because for all  ∈ ( , `V/H], we have
mΠ( )
m 
< 0, mΠ( )
mfV
< 0 and m
2Π( )
mfVm 



































To sum up, we obtain that 3ΔΠ
3fV
















Proof of part 2: In this part, we demonstrate following result: when l < l*
and d > 0, 3ΔΠ
3fV






- the case where * > `V/H.
We first discuss the case when lV < l < l* . In this case, we know that





< 0. Observing from 3ΔΠ
3fV








Then, we investigate the case when l ≤ lV. Since l ≤ lV is equivalent to
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In summary, a sufficient condition for 3ΔΠ
3fV















. To sum up, we obtain
that 3ΔΠ
3fV






when l < l* and d > 0.
A.2 Proofs for theOptimal Strategy and Sensitivity
Analyses of Pre-shipment Finance Model
A.2.1 Proofs for the Optimal Strategy
Proof of Theorem 3 part 1:
production-stage optimal decisions are production quantity and pre-shipment








(b − 1@)@ − H@ − A?!?






0 ≤ (1 + A?)!? ≤ (b − 1@)@,
the problem is naturally divided into two scenarios, because production quantity
is binding either by capacity  or by resource constraint V+!?
H
. We discuss two
scenarios one by one.
When production quantity is binding by capacity  ,the straightforward




. According to this inequality, !∗? = 0, because pre-shipment
finance will be applied only when production resource is constraining production
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decision due to the cost of pre-shipment finance. The problem formulation
followed by above discussion is:
c∗?
(




(b − 1@)@ − H@




which is identical to the formulation of basic model when  ≤ V
H




(0, 0), if (b, V) ∈
{






, if (b, V) ∈
{
H < b < H + 21 , H ≤ V
}
( , 0), if (b, V) ∈
{
b ≥ H + 21 , H ≤ V
}
.
When production quantity is binding by resource constraint, or equiv-





Therefore, problem formulation becomes:
c∗?
(




(b − 1@)@ − H@ − A?!?





0 ≤ (1 + A?)!? ≤ (b − 1@)@.
and each primal constraint is coupled with a dual variable, we define the variables
as follows:
H@ − !? ≤ V < _1 >
!? ≤ H − V < _2 >
−(b − 1@)@ + (1 + A?)!? ≤ 0 < _3 >
−@ ≤ 0 < `1 >
−!? ≤ 0 < `2 >
(A.12)
Then, the dual feasible equations are
b − 21@∗ − H = H_1 − (b − 21@∗)_3 − `1, (A.13)
−A? = −_1 + _2 + (1 + A?)_3 − `2, (A.14)
_1, _2, _3, `1, `2 ≥ 0,
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and complementary slackness are
_1(V + !∗? − H@∗) = 0,
_2(H − V − !∗?) = 0,
_3
(








The optimal decisions are categorized by all permutations of value of dual
variables (_1, _2, _3, `1, `2), specifically, the value of each dual variable takes
either ≥ 0 or = 0 indicating the corresponding constraint is either binding or not
binding respectively.
We classify the optimal decisions into four cases by whether @∗ and !∗? taking
positive or zero value, or equivalent condition from complementary slackness,
whether `1 and `2 are ≥ 0 or = 0. Therein, the case @∗ = 0 and !∗? ≥ 0 doesn’t
exist, because the negative profit occurs, specifically, on the one hand there is no
revenue generated due to no production, on the other hand pre-shipment finance
is applied with some cost.
The remaining three cases are as follows:
Case 1: @∗ = !∗? = 0.
In this case, `1 ≥ 0 and `2 ≥ 0. The value of remaining dual variables calculated
from substituting optimal decisions into complementary slackness are _1 = 0,
_2 = 0 and _3 ≥ 0. The uncertainties in the region derived through replacing
all above primary and dual variables with their value into Equation (A.13) and
(A.14) are 
V < H 
0 ≤ b ≤ H,
Case 2: @∗ > 0 and !∗? = 0.
In this case, we have `1 = 0 and `2 ≥ 0. Immediate results drew in this case are
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_2 = 0 because of  > V/H. The complementary slackness for _1 and _3 are
_1(V − H@∗) = 0 and _3(b − 1@∗)@∗ = 0,
as a result, we have following sub-cases based whether _1 and _3 are ≥ 0 or = 0:
1. when _1 = _3 = 0, @∗ < VH and @
∗ < b
1
are drew from complementary
slackness. Dual feasible (A.13) becomes b − 21@∗ − H = 0 and (A.14)
becomes −A? = −`2. Therefore, we have @∗ = b−H21 . Since 0 < @
∗ < V/H






b > H, V > 0
because V/H > @∗ > 0 and  > V/H;
2. when _1 = 0 and _3 ≥ 0, @∗ < VH and @
∗ = b
1
are drew from complementary
slackness. The dual feasible (A.13) and (A.14) are −b − H = b_3 and
−A? = (1 + A?)_3 − `2 respectively. Noting that the dual feasible (A.13)
can’t hold because b ≥ 0, H ≥ 0 and _3 ≥ 0. Therefore, this case doesn’t
exist;
3. when _1 ≥ 0 and _3 = 0, @∗ = VH and @
∗ < b
1
are drew from complementary
slackness. The dual feasible (A.13) and (A.14) are b − 21V
H
− H = H_1
and −A? = −_1 − `2 respectively. From the dual feasible (A.13), we have
b ≥ H + 21V
H
, then substitute _1 with A? − `2 for the dual feasible (A.13),




≤ b ≤ (1 + A?)H + 21VH
0 < V < H ;
4. when _1 ≥ 0 and _3 ≥ 0, @∗ = VH =
b
1
is drew from complementary
slackness. For simplicity, we use @∗ = b
1
to write over dual feasible (A.13)
and (A.14), they are −b − H = H_1 + b_3 and −A? = −_1 + (1 + A?)_3 − `2
respectively. Noting that the dual feasible (A.13) can’t hold, therefore this
case doesn’t exist.
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Case 3: @∗ > 0 and !∗? > 0. In this case `1 = `2 = 0. Observing that the
dual feasible (A.14) −A? = −_1 + _2 + (1 + A?)_3 holds only if _1 > 0, because
A? is strictly positive. In addition, _1 > 0 results in V + !∗? − H@∗ = 0 according
to the complementary slackness. Therefore, given _1 > 0 and `1 = `2 = 0, there
are only four sub-cases in terms of whether _2 and _3 are ≥ 0 or = 0:
1. when _2 = _3 = 0, !∗? < H − V and (b − 1@∗)@∗ > (1 + A?)!∗? are
drew from complementary slackness. The corresponding dual feasible
(A.13) and (A.14) are b − 21@∗ − H = H_1 and A? = _1, which lead to
@∗ =
b−(1+A?)H







21 − V because V + !
∗
? − H@∗ = 0.
Due to (b − 1@∗)@∗ > (1 + A?)!∗?, @∗ > 0 and H − V > !∗? > 0, the state
space is restricted in the range
(1 + A?)H + 21VH < b ≤ (1 + A?)H + 21 
V < H ;
2. when _2 = 0 and _3 ≥ 0, !∗? < H − V and (b − 1@∗)@∗ = (1 + A?)!∗?
are gotten from complementary slackness. The dual feasible (A.13) and
(A.14) are b − 21@∗ − H = H_1 − (b − 21@∗)_3 and A? = _1 − (1 + A?)_3,
losing _1 by combining the two dual feasible equations together we yield
−
(
b − 21@∗ − (1 + A?)H
)





4(1+A?) because (b − 1@
∗)@∗ = (1 + A?)!∗?. In addition,
by substituting @∗ and !∗? into V + !∗? − H@∗ = 0, we have that the state







21 = 0. Define a quadratic










has maximizer b = (1 + A?)H because
36V (b)
3b







= 0 and V ∈ [V, H ), there is no state space for this case to
be held;
3. when _2 ≥ 0 and _3 = 0, !∗? = H − V and (b − 1@∗)@∗ > (1 + A?)!∗? are
drew from complementary slackness, we further have @∗ =  because of
V + !∗? − H@∗ = 0. As a result, (b − 1 ) > (1 + A?) (H − V) should be
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satisfied. From dual feasible (A.13) and (A.14), that are b − 21 − H = H_1
and A? = _1 − _2 respectively, b > (1 + A?)H + 21 is derived. Overall,
state space that leads to optimal decisions equal to @∗ =  and !∗? = H − V
is 
b ≥ (1 + A?)H + 21 
(b − 1 ) > (1 + A?) (H − V)
V < H ;
⇒

b ≥ (1 + A?)H + 21 
V < H ;
4. when _2 ≥ 0 and _3 ≥ 0, we have complementary slackness !∗? = H − V,
(b − 1@∗)@∗ = (1 + A?)!∗? and V + !∗? − H@∗ = 0. Therefore, optimal
decisions are identical to previous case, that are @∗ =  and !∗? = H − V,
and state space follows a linear relation (b −  ) = (1 + A?) (H − V). In
addition, using dual feasible (A.13) and (A.14), that are b − 21 − H =
H_1 − (b − 21 )_3 and A? = _1 − _2 − (1 + A?)_3 in case, we have(
b−21 − (1+A?)H
)
(1+_3) = H_2 by losing _1, which provide a range for
state space b ≥ (1+A?)H+21 . Because line (b− ) = (1+A?) (H − V)
doesn’t pass through
{




The definition of state spaces in proposition is gotten from combing above ranges
with same optimal decisions and consider the lower and upper bound of Ṽ that
are V and V.
Proof of Theorem 3 part 2:
We derive the optimal capacity investment level for pre-shipment finance model




We prove Π? ( ) is concave in  by demonstrating the first order derivative of
Π? ( ) is continuous and monotonically decreasing in  . We first calculate the
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first order derivative of Π? ( ):
mΠ? ( )
m 







(b − H − 21 ) 5 (b, V)3b3V
+





b − (1 + A?)H − 21 
)
5 (b, V)3b3V.
Although mΠ? ( )
m 
is continuous in  , it has a piecewise form depending on the
permutation among H , V and V. For the ease of calculation, we write the











































(1 + A?)H − 21 
)






b − (1 + A?)H −
21 
)
5b (b)3b. Then we prove the monotonically decreasing trend by calculating






























5b (b)3b < 0. As a result, we finish the proof of
the concavity of Π? ( ) in  .
Next, we discuss  ∗? piece by piece according to the piecewise structure
of mΠ? ( )
m 
, because mΠ? ( )
m 
in different piece has unique form. Specially, we
discuss the conditions under which  ∗? = 0,  ∗? ∈ (0, V/H],  ∗? ∈ (V/H, V/H] and
 ∗? ∈ (V/H,∞) respectively:
1. under condition mΠD ( )
m 





, Π? ( )
decreases in  ≥ 0, therefore,  ∗? equals to 0;
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≤ 0 and mΠD ( )
m 

0 > 0, where the
inequalities are equivalent to E
[ (
b̃ − H − 2V
H
)+] ≤ l < E[(b̃ − H)+] ,  ∗?
lies in (0, V/H] which is solved from mΠD ( )
m 
= 0, namely  ∗? =  * ;










≤ 0, namely E
[
(b̃ − (1 +
A?)H − 2V/H)+
]
≤ l < E
[
(b̃ − H − 21V/H)+
]
,  ∗? is the unique solution of
mΠ?1 ( )
m 
= 0, we define  ∗? under this condition as  ? (l) which is in the
range (V/H, V/H];





> 0 which is l < E
[
(b̃ − (1 + A?)H −
2V/H)+
]
,  ∗? > V/H and is the unique solution of
mΠ?2 ( )
m 





= 0. Furthermore, knowing that  ∗? under this condition
is the unique solution of l = E
[
(b̃ − (1 + A?)H − 21 )+
]
and  * (l) is
the unique solution of l = E
[
(b̃ − H − 21 )+
]
,  * and  ∗? have following
relation (1 + A?)H + 21 ∗? = H + 21 * , so  ∗? =  * −
A?H
21 .
Proof of Corollary 3:














H+21 (b− H−21 ) 5 (b, V)3b3V = 0. Meanwhile, the optimal
capacity investment level for pre-shipment model is either  % or  * − A?H/2.
We discuss the value of pre-shipment finance in terms of capacity investment
level given same l case by case:
1.  % optimizes the pre-shipment model objective when Ẽ
b
[





≤ l < Ẽ
b
[


























(1 + A?)H − 21 
)
5 (b, V)3b3V = 0. In order to compare   and  %, we
142













b − (1 + A?)H − 21 
)
5 (b, V)3b3V
























b − (1 + A?)H − 21 
)
5 (b, V)3b3V > 0.













(b̃ − (1 + A?)H − 2VH )
+] and  * − A?H/2 > V/H >  .
We then discuss the value of pre-shipment finance in terms of optimal expected
profit given same l case by case: The value generated from pre-shipment finance










































b − (1 + A?)H
)









= 0. In addition, Δ? ( ) increasing in  is derived from the first














b − (1 + A?)H − 21 
)
5 (b, V)3b3V > 0.
Therefore, Δ? ( ) > 0 for all  ∈ (V/H, V/H). Π( ) < Π?1( ) is derived
from following inequalities, that is Π?1( ? ) − Π( ) > Π?1( ) − Π( ) =
Δ? ( ) > 0.
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A.2.2 Proofs for the sensitivity analyses
From analytical result in Theorem 3 part 2, in the pre-shipment finance model,
the sensitivity results that are not yet explored only if  ∗? takes value  ? . We will
prove the sensitivity analyses results through the implicit function of  ? that is
mΠ?
m 













































Similarly, in order to derive sensitivity analyses for Π? ( ? ), we standardize the
first stage objective function as follows









( ) 8 = 1, 2, · · · , 7 are defined as:
+
?



































(1 − d2) + `b + dfbI0 − H
)
















































(1 − d2) + `b + dfbI0 − H − 1











































(1 − d2) + `b + dfb I0 − (1 + A?)H
)






















Proof of Proposition 9:
We will prove the impact of d on  ? andΠ? ( ? ) one by one. Firstly, we prove





































































(1 + A?)H + 21 − `b
)






Up to here, we prove that m
2Π? ( )
m md
> 0 for all  , therefore, the sensitivity analyses
with respect to  ? are derived, that is  ? increases in d.
We then proof the impact of d on Π? ( ).
Π? ( )
md
will have no term from
differentiating the limits of integration, because the integrands (optimal profit
in production stage) among con-terminal domain of integrations are continuous.
Starting from the derivative of Equation (A.17) with respect to d, since profit
function Π? ( ) is continuous and it derivatives at the boundaries are cancelled
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Ṽ and Ĩ0 3= Ṽ−`VfV , we have mΠ? ( )md = ( 11−d2 ) fbfV Eb [ EV |b [@∗( , b̃, Ṽ) ·(



































(b̃ − `b), f2V (1 − d2)
)
and @∗( , b, V) is piecewise differentiable and continuous, E
V |b
[












@∗( , b, Ṽ) ·
(
























@∗( , b̃, Ṽ) ·
(
Ṽ − `V − d
fV
fb







[m@∗( , b, Ṽ)
mV







5 (b, V)3b3V > 0.
Proof of Proposition 10 - The impact of fb on Π? ( ? ):









, the result is













































































































































Noting that there is no term from differentiating the limits of integration,
because the integrand equals to 0 when substituting the variable of integra-
tion with the corresponding limits containing fb . By the definition of @∗,







1 − d2 + dĨ0
)
@∗( , Ĩ2, Ĩ0)
]
. Therefore, we



































































































Observing from above equation, we obtain that mΠ? ( )
mfb
> 0 for all  when d ≥ 0.




when d < 0. First of all,






















































































































































































> 0 for all  > 0.

































































































































> 0 for all  > 0.
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( H + 21 (I0fV+`V)
H















































A?H, we further cal-
culate Equation (A.21) and obtain that, 1) whenl >
(
1−Φ













= 0 and 2) when l ≤
(
1 −Φ




























Therefore, we summarize the impact of fb on Π? ( ? ) as what showed in
Proposition 10.
Proof of Proposition 11 - The impact of fb on  ? :



















lies above or below zero. Therefore, we calculate m
2Π? ( )
m mfb

































we find that m
2Π? ( )
m mfb
> 0 for all  when d ≥ 0.
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when d < 0 by several steps.













= 0. Due to mΠ? ( )
m 
decreases










as fb increasing from f
 ?
b
































1 − d2 + dI0 − A?H/fb
)
q(I2)3I2q(I0)3I0
















































1 − d2 + dI0
)
q(I2)3I2q(I0)3I0,











































































when fb → 0 from Equation












 ? , Therefore, we characterize lim
fb→0
























`b − (1 + A?)H − 21 
)
q(I0)3I0,
if 0 <  < `b−(1+A?)H21
−l +
(




q(I0)3I0, if `b−(1+A?)H21 ≤  <
`b−H
21
−l, if  ≥ `b−H21 ,



















21 if l =
(
1 −Φ







































( (1 + A?)H + 21 lim
fb→0














( H + 21 lim
fb→0





















= 0 if l >
(
1 − Φ

























































Proof of Proposition 12 - The impact of fV on  ? :














. We calculate m
2Π? ( )
m mfV




































when H ≥ `V,
m2Π? ( )
m mfV
> 0. Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient condition










































(1 − d2) + `b + dfb I0 − (1 + A?)H − 21`V/H
)
q(I2)3I2q(I0)3I0.










































































We know that mΠ? ( )
m 








(d) strictly increases in d. For this reason, we can further
















(−1) < l ?
V
(1), we have a unique d denoted
by d ?
V






































. Therefore, the sensitivity result can be re-















and d < d ?
V
(l),





















and d > d ?
V
(l),















and d = d ?
V






Proof of Proposition 13 - The impact of fV on Π? ( ? ):









, we prove the result
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. Since Equation (A.17) has no term from
differentiating the limits of integration, we take the derivative of it with respect to















( H + 21 (I0fV+`V)
H




























< 0 for all fV.




under condition H ? > `V. First of all,

































( H ? − `V
f2
V













































> 0 is true by writing















































































































· )? ( ? )









q (I2)3I2q (I0)3I0 + 2
∫ H ? −`VfV
−∞
∫ ∞






( ? − `V/H)
fV
,













when fV takes special values,
that arefV → 0 andfV =
dfb H






































































is highly depend on the
value of lim
fV→0



















(1 − d2) + `b + dfb I0 − H − 21 
)

















(1 − d2) + `b + dfb I0 − (1 + A? )H − 21 
)































































is equivalent to l < lΠ?
V





21 , = 

?


















































As a result, we obtain that only when l < lΠ?
V
(l, d) and d > 0 there exists
a unique fΠ?
V













< 0 when fV > f
Π?
V




≤ 0 for all fV.
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Proof of Proposition 14:
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 7, so we omit the proof steps.
A.3 Proofs for theOptimal Strategy and Sensitivity
Analyses of Hedging Model
A.3.1 Proofs for the Optimal Strategy
Proof of Theorem 6:
The optimal capacity investment level for basic model is derived from the
expected profit in capacity investment stage Πℎ ( , ℎ), namely Equation (5.2).
To prove the concavity of Πℎ ( , ℎ) on ( , ℎ), we calculate the hessian-matrix
H
(












ª®®¬ term by term.







(b − H − 21 ) 5b (b)3b, if  ∈
[
0,









( b − H − 21 ) 5 ( b , V)3b3V, if  ∈
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5b (b)3b, if  ∈
[
0,






















, if  ∈
( ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ)V
H
,
ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ)V
H
)
0, if  ∈








0, if  ∈
[
0,
ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ)V
H
]










3b, if  ∈
( ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ)V
H
,
ℎ`V + (1 − ℎ)V
H
)
0 if  ∈








0, if  ∈
[
0,














b − H −
21
(




5 ( b , V)3b3V
, if  ∈
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From above equations, we obtain the hessian-matrix and observe that
m2Πℎ ( ,ℎ)
m 2
≤ 0 and m
2Πℎ ( ,ℎ)
mℎ2











for all ( , ℎ) which proves that the Hessian is negative
semi-definite. Thus Πℎ ( , ℎ) is concave in ( , ℎ). As Πℎ ( , ℎ) is concave in
( , ℎ), we now solve for max
 ≥0,ℎ∈[0,1]
Πℎ ( , ℎ) by dividing the expected profit into
three sub-problems i = 1,2,3 according to the range of  as follows:
Πℎ ( , ℎ) =

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H
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Π3ℎ ( , ℎ) if  ∈
















( , ℎ), we find that Π1
ℎ
( , ℎ) = ΠD ( ) where ΠD ( )
is the expected profit function of the benchmark model. Since mΠℎ ( ,ℎ)
mℎ
≡
0, the value of ℎ doesn’t affect the optimal expected profit. Utilizing the
optimal capacity investment strategy for ΠD ( ), we have  ∗ℎ = 0 and ℎ
∗ ∈





≤ l;  ∗
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=  * (l) when Ẽ
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ous, the optimal decision is never in this region.
Lastly, in the second region of  , we derive optimal  ∗
ℎ
and ℎ∗ for sub-
problem Π2
ℎ







and ℎ ∈ [0, 1], to simplify analysis and deal with 1− ℎ appearing at denominator,
we further divide the range of optimal decisions into following three sub-cases
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To obtain ( ∗
ℎ
, ℎ∗), we discuss under what condition the internal and boundary solutions
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> 0 for all ℎ ∈ [0, 1) when  ≤ `V/H.
Sub-case 1  ∗
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In this case, define  ∗
ℎ
(ℎ) as the internal optimal point which is solved by Equation























`V−V . As a result, optimal capacity
level  ∗
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H+21 (b − H − 21 ) 5b (b)3b = 0
which implies  ∗
ℎ
equals to the resource unconstrained capacity level  * . As
 ∗
ℎ
∈ (V/H, `V/H), the optimality condition should satisfy Ẽ
b
[(







b̃ − H − 21V
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≤ l < Ẽ
b
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Sub-case 2  ∗
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In this case,  is an interior solution. We define  ∗
ℎ
(ℎ) is an internal optimal
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(b − H − 21 )+
V] 5V (V)3V for a
given ℎ. And ℎ∗ can be internal optimal solved by











)+V] 5V (V)3V = 0 or take boundary value ℎ = 0 or ℎ = V−H ∗ℎ
V−`V
.
We first discuss the optimality condition under which ℎ∗ is at two boundaries:




ℎ ∈ (0, 1), respectively.
For the optimal solution for Sub-case 2 lies in boundary 1)  ∈ (`V/H, V/H)
and ℎ = 0, we obtain that the condition under which ℎ∗ = 0 is optimal. For

















)+V] 5V (V)3V ≤ 0. As mΠ2ℎ ( ,ℎ)mℎ 
 =`V/H,ℎ=0













= 0 where  ℎ > `V/H always holds. As a result,
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. For the set[
min{ ℎ, V/H}, V/H
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)+V] 5V (V)3V < 0 must holds indicting  ℎ < V/H. From














< 0. As  ∗
ℎ
is the unique solution of Π2
ℎ




H+21 (b − H −
21 ) 5 (b, V)3b3V, we find that  ∗
ℎ
equals to the resource constrained capacity
level   (l). From above discussion about Equation (A.24),   (l) >  ℎ is






b̃ − H − 21V
H
)+V] 5V (V)3V ≤ 0. (A.25)
To transform Inequality (A.25) into an inequality with respect to l, we define
lℎ as the unique solution of





b̃ − H − 21V
H
)+V] 5V (V)3V = 0,
then Inequality (A.25) is equivalent to l ≤ lℎ. Therefore, the condition
for ( ∗
ℎ









b̃ − H − 21V
H





b̃ − H − 21V
H
)+V] 5V (V)3V ≥ 0, we have that   (lℎ) ≥ V/H
meaning that lℎ ≤ 0.
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Then we discuss the optimality condition under which the optimal solution
for Sub-case 2 lies in boundary 2)  = ℎ`V+(1−ℎ)V
H
and ℎ ∈ (0, 1). From Equation











= −l < 0, so this boundary doesn’t contain
optimal point.
Lastly, we discuss the internal optimal decision for Sub-case 2. Define
( 
ℎ
, ℎ) as the unique solution jointly solved by Equation (A.23) and Equation
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), ℎ ∈ [0, 1). From Equation (A.23), to obtain
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5V (V)3V. In addition, define  ∗ℎ (ℎ) as the
implicit solution of Equation (A.23) for a given ℎ. Substituting  with  ∗
ℎ
(ℎ) to
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, ℎ) to be












Sub-case 3  ∗
ℎ
= `V/H, ℎ∗ ∈ [0, 1]
As  ∗
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)+V] 5V (V)3V > 0 for
all ℎ ∈ [0, 1], so we obtain optimal strategy ( ∗
ℎ
, ℎ∗) = (`V/H, 1). Define
 ∗
ℎ
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≤ 0. To summarize,
we have ( ∗
ℎ

























(ℎ) < `V/H, we also discuss the condition under which ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
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= −l + Ẽ
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5V (V)3V < 0. To summarized,
we have ( ∗
ℎ































































b̃ − H − 21Ṽ
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)+) , we therefore have cases in Theorem 6.
Proof of Corollary 6:
We prove this proposition by recalling from Chapter 3 that the resource con-




H+21  (b − H −
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. From Theorem 6, we have that  
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(b − H − 21 
ℎ
)+
V] 5V (V)3b3V = 0. To compare  ℎ and  ,
we calculate


















(b − H − 21 )+
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decreases in  , we conclude that   (l) ≥
 
ℎ
(l, ℎ) for all ℎ ∈ (0, 1] and   (l) =  
ℎ
(l, ℎ) when ℎ = 0.
A.3.2 Proofs for the Sensitivity Analyses
Proof of Proposition 15:
Since now (b̃, Ṽ) follows bivariate normal distribution, we have the conditional
distributions are normally distributed with parameters





( Ṽ − `V), f2b (1 − d2)
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(b̃ − `b), f2V (1 − d2)
)
.
We transform the covariance thresholds using their double-integral form using
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)+)
= 0 when dfb =
21fV
H
, we further transform


































where Ĩ ∼ # (0, 1), 0 and 1 are


















for all I, where -̃ follows standard normal



























, if 1 < 0.
.




b̃ − H − 21Ṽ
H
)+)











. The optimal capacity investment and hedging
strategy proof is omitted due to the similarity to the proof of Theorem 6.
To prove the sensitivity of Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗), the expected profit in the capacity
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investment stage Πℎ ( , ℎ), i.e. Equation (5.2) is transformed in standard normal
















Πℎ ( , ℎ) = −l +
4∑
8=1
+ ℎ8 ( , ℎ) (A.26)
where + ℎ
8
( , ℎ) 8 = 1, 2, · · · , 4 are defined as follows
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 − 1 2
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21 (I0 (1−ℎ)fV+`V )








(1 − d2) + `b + dfb I0 − H − 1




Proof of Proposition 16:
Noting from Proposition 15, Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) is sensitive to d only when d > 0
169
and 0 < l < Ẽ
b,Ṽ
[





, since both  ∗
ℎ
= 0 and ℎ∗ = 1 imply
Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) is not a function of d. There are two cases of optimal solutions to
discuss.









terized by d > 0 and max{0, lℎ} < l < Ẽ
b,Ṽ
[

























solution. To derive the sensitivity result, we take derivative of Equation (A.26)
with respect to d, as the derivative as integral boundaries are vanished due to the
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( , b, Ṽ)
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5 (b, V)3b3V > 0
for all  > 0 and ℎ ∈ [0, 1).
Secondly, we prove the sensitivity result when optimal strategy is ( ∗
ℎ
, ℎ∗) =(
  (l), 0
)
that is characterized by d > 21fV
Hfb
and 0 < l < lℎ. In this case,
Πℎ
(






where Π( ) is the expected profit of basic model.




increases in d, we proved that Πℎ
(
  (l), 0
)
increases in d under condition d > 21fV
Hfb
and 0 < l < lℎ.
Proof of Proposition 17:
Weprove the effect offb onΠℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ




where ΠD ( ) is the expected profit function for resource unconstrained bench-















 =min{ * ,`V/H}
under all conditions that lead to ℎ∗ = 1. And we proved in Proposition 2 that
mΠD ( )
mfb
> 0 for all  > 0. Therefore, we obtain that Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) strictly increases
in fb under all conditions that lead to ℎ∗ = 1.
Then we prove the sensitivity result for cases that ℎ∗ ≠ 1. There are two









characterized by d > 0 and max{0, lℎ} < l < Ẽ
b,Ṽ
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optimal solution. Taking derivative of Equation (A.26) with respect to fb , we
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According to the Stein’s Lemma, above equation is transformed into
























































as d > 0, we have that mΠℎ ( ,ℎ)
mfb
> 0 for all  > 0 including  =  ∗
ℎ
. To
summarize, we proved that Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) strictly increases in fb .





  (l), 0
)
that is characterized by d > 21fV
Hfb
and 0 < l < lℎ. In this case,
Πℎ
(






where Π( ) is the expected profit of basic model,












 =  (l)
according to Envelope theorem.




increases in fb when d > 0, we proved that
Πℎ
(
  (l), 0
)
increases in fb under condition d >
21fV
Hfb
and 0 < l < lℎ.
Proof of Proposition 18:
Noting from Proposition 15, Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) can be sensitive to fV only when
d > 0 and 0 < l < Ẽ
b,Ṽ
[





, since both  ∗
ℎ
= 0 and ℎ∗ = 1
imply Πℎ ( ∗ℎ, ℎ
∗) is not a function of fV. To derive the sensitivity result, we
discuss the sign of





































when d > 0, we discuss the sensitivity result one by
one.
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= 0 for all
 > 0 including  =  ∗
ℎ
.
Secondly, we prove the sensitivity result when optimal strategy is ( ∗
ℎ
, ℎ∗) =(
  (l), 0
)
that is characterized by d > 21fV
Hfb
and 0 < l < lℎ. In this case,
Πℎ
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 =  (l)
according to Envelope theorem.
We have mΠ( )
mfV














( H + 21(I0fV+`V)
H












b̃ − H − 21V
H






























> 0 in this case.
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